IS THERE A “RELIGIOUS QUESTION” DOCTRINE?
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE RELIGIOUS
PRACTICES AND BELIEFS
Jared A. Goldstein*
In the familiar 1947 movie “Miracle on 34th Street,” faith and
law come into comical conflict. As anyone who has seen the movie
remembers, the plot concerns the identity of a jolly, portly, whitebearded old man who calls himself Kris Kringle and claims to be
the one and only Santa Claus. When the old man’s apparent
delusion lands him in a state mental institution, the film’s romantic
lead, a lawyer, sets out to free him. An involuntary commitment
hearing is called to determine the purported Santa’s sanity, and the
old man’s lawyer sets out to prove that his client is the true Santa.
The district attorney argues that the existence of Santa Claus is not
a proper subject for judicial inquiry. The judge considers this but
rules that the existence of Santa Claus is a factual issue to be
resolved through evidence. The question of proof is somewhat
difficult: how can the existence of Santa Claus be established using
the tools of law, when, as our lawyer-hero explains, belief in Santa
Claus is based on faith, and faith “means believing in things when
common sense tells you not to”?
Fortunately for movie watchers, the writers of “Miracle on
34th Street” were unfamiliar with the principle that courts are
prohibited from resolving religious questions. Three years before
the release of the movie, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
United States v. Ballard, which declares that the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment cordon off a “forbidden domain” that
judges and juries may not enter: they may not attempt to determine
the “truth or falsity” of religious claims.1 Since Ballard, the Court
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has greatly expanded its articulation of this prohibition, stating that
not only are courts prohibited from attempting to determine the
truth of religious beliefs, they may not seek to resolve
“controversies over religious doctrine and practice,”2 may not
undertake “interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion,”3 may make “no
inquiry into religious doctrine,”4 and may give “no consideration
of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or
the tenets of faith.”5 Courts are thus said to be barred from
resolving all questions about religious practices and doctrine. If
the existence of Santa Claus is a religious question, courts may not
answer it.
In Employment Division v. Smith,6 the Supreme Court
indicated that the prohibition against judicial resolution of religious
questions should be understood to apply broadly and absolutely.
Since that decision in 1990, lower courts have relied on the
prohibition to dismiss a wide range of otherwise ordinary disputes,
whenever their resolution would require examination of religious
matters. Courts deem contracts unenforceable when they contain
religious terms that might require judicial construction.7 In child
custody and divorce cases, courts refuse to determine whether a
custodial parent abided by prenuptial or divorce agreements
mandating that children be raised in a particular religion because it
would require courts to examine religious questions.8 Courts have
refused to adjudicate negligence claims against churches, religious
therapists, and faith healers because of the difficulties of
determining the reasonableness of a religious actor’s conduct
without examining religious standards.9 Courts have held
unenforceable consumer fraud statutes prohibiting the false
2
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labeling of food to be kosher under Orthodox Jewish dietary
standards because, among other reasons, such statutes call on
courts to examine religious doctrines and practices to determine
whether the food actually complies with Jewish law.10
Employment discrimination claims against religious organizations
are frequently dismissed because they might call upon courts to
evaluate whether religious doctrines played any role in the
employment decisions at issue.11 A broad prohibition on judicial
examination of religious questions thus has had the effect of
immunizing from judicial review a wide range of conduct simply
because examining the conduct could entail examining religious
beliefs or practices.
As several commentators have noted, the prohibition on
judicial inquiry into religious questions has much in common with
the political question doctrine.12 Just as the Constitution gives the
political branches, and not the courts, the authority to resolve
political questions, so the Constitution can be understood to leave
questions about religion to religious bodies. It is appealing to
believe that, just as Marbury v. Madison declares that there are
questions “in their nature political” and therefore unsuitable to
10
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judicial resolution, so there are questions that by their nature are
religious and likewise off-limits to the courts.13 Courts have no
business deciding whether to declare war or impose taxes; nor
should courts have any role in deciding what prayers should be
said in church or who should be elected Pope.
Like the political question doctrine, the prohibition on judicial
inquiry into religious questions is understood to be a justiciability
doctrine—once it becomes apparent that the resolution of a case
would require a court to undertake examination of religious
matters, the court has no choice but to dismiss the case.14 The
prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions is also
said to rest on two considerations analogous to prominent
considerations in the political question doctrine. First, courts are
said to be incompetent to resolve religious questions,15 just as
courts are said to be incompetent to resolve political questions.16
Second, the prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions
reflects a concern about separation of powers—in this case,
between church and state—just as the political question doctrine
reflects concerns over the separation of powers between the
judicial and the political branches.17
13
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The post-Smith adoption of a broad prohibition on judicial
inquiry into religious questions has received little attention, either
in the courts or in academic literature. To be sure, many articles
have examined how the prohibition should be applied in various
contexts. Some commentators have thus argued that kosher food
laws are consistent with constitutional limitations on the courts’
authority, while others have taken a contrary view.18
Commentators have likewise taken differing positions on how the
prohibition should be applied in adjudicating employment
discrimination claims against religious entities, negligence claims
against religious actors, contract claims involving religious terms,
and child custody cases, among other subjects.19 Considerable
attention has been given to how statutes addressing religion can be
construed consistently with the prohibition.20 But with the
adoption of an apparently absolute judicial prohibition on the
resolution of all religious questions, the time has come to ask a
much more basic question, much as Louis Henkin asked with
regard to the political question doctrine in 1976: Is there a religious
question doctrine?21
As a purely descriptive matter, it is clear that the courts
believe that such a doctrine exists and routinely dismiss cases for
resolve political questions because of a “lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards”).
18
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no other identifiable reason than that adjudication would require
inquiry into religious matters. This Article argues, however, that it
is incoherent to speak of a general prohibition on judicial
examination of religious questions. There are numerous contexts in
which courts routinely and legitimately undertake factual inquiries
into religious doctrines and practices. The question is not whether
courts may resolve religious questions but which religious
questions lie beyond judicial ability and authority. This Article
answers that question by arguing that, for both institutional and
constitutional reasons, courts are barred from resolving normative
questions about religion, such as the validity or truth of religious
beliefs or the wisdom or efficacy of religious practices, but neither
the institutional competence of the courts nor the separationist
principle embodied in the Establishment Clause bars judicial
resolution of positive religious questions, such as assessments of
the content of religious doctrine, or determinations of the centrality
or importance of a religious practice within the context of a
religion. In other words, on religious matters, courts may not tell
people what they should do or believe, but they may determine, in
the sense of making factual findings, what beliefs people hold and
what practices they engage in.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of the prohibition on
judicial examination of religious questions. As that Part shows, the
scope of the prohibition has increased exponentially in recent
years, with little discussion or dissent. Prior to Ballard, courts had
long applied a limited common law principle of deference to
ecclesiastical judgments, which barred courts from secondguessing the doctrinal decisions of church bodies. Beginning in
the 1960s, with the Court’s decision in cases addressing disputes
over the ownership of church property and culminating in the
Smith decision in 1990, the principle has grown to an apparently
absolute prohibition on judicial examination of all questions
touching on religion. Courts are thus said to be equally barred
from determining normative questions, such as whether Jesus
really was the messiah or whether Devil’s Tower really is sacred,
as they are barred from determining positive questions, such as
whether throwing rice is considered a central part of a wedding
ceremony or whether Jews consider pork to be kosher.
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Part II shows that, contrary to the Court’s language, an
absolute prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions
is neither possible nor advisable. There are substantial contexts in
which courts legitimately inquire into religious questions and could
not apply the Religion Clauses, or the hundreds of statutes that
give special treatment to religion and religious practices, if they
were prohibited from doing so.
Most prominently, any
determination of whether a belief or practice is “religious” and
therefore subject to the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment
Clause necessarily entails inquiry into the content of religious
doctrines and practices, and courts routinely make such inquiries,
notwithstanding the apparent prohibition on judicial examination
of religious questions.
Part III examines the argument that courts are institutionally
incompetent to resolve religious questions. This rationale for
prohibiting judicial assessment of religious questions depends
crucially on a conception of law and religion as epistemologically
distinct spheres—that is, that the validity of religious claims
depends on faith, miracles, mystical experiences, and other
nonrational sources, while law discovers truth exclusively through
reason and empiricism. Under this conception, courts cannot
resolve religious questions because they are not susceptible to the
analytical tools available through law. This understanding of the
difference between religious and legal thinking counsels in favor
of a prohibition on judicial resolution of normative questions about
religion. In contrast, positive religious questions, such as those
concerning the content of religious beliefs or the importance of a
religious practice within the context of a religion, do not call on
courts to employ anything other than ordinary tools of judicial
factfinding and can be resolved through resort to traditional
evidence, such as reliance on expert witnesses, treatises, and
factual testimony.
Part IV examines the argument, based on the separationist
principle embodied in the Establishment Clause bars, that courts
are barred from resolving religious questions because such
questions are constitutionally committed to religious bodies.
While a judicial determination that a religious claim is true or valid
would necessarily intrude into the sphere of religion protected by
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the Constitution, courts neither become excessively entangled in
religious matters nor endorse religious doctrines merely by
describing them in positive terms. The Religion Clauses are thus
properly understood to prohibit judicial determinations of the truth
or validity of religious claims but not to prohibit courts from
making positive assessments of the content of religious doctrine
and practices.
I. THE CREATION AND EXPANSION OF THE PROHIBITION ON
JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American
common law included a generally applicable principle that courts
should avoid deciding certain kinds of religious questions out of
respect for the separate authority of religious bodies. In the last
sixty years that limited principle has grown into a seemingly
absolute prohibition on all judicial inquiry into questions touching
on religion, regardless of the type of question or how the question
arises. The expansion began in 1944 with the Court’s decision in
Ballard, when the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits courts from determining the truth or validity of
religious claims. Twenty-five years later, the Court declared that
the Establishment Clause prohibits courts from interpreting the
meaning of religious terms or weighing the importance of
doctrines or practices in the context of a religion. Although that
principle was articulated in broad terms, for the next twenty years
the Court appeared ambivalent about the precise scope of the
prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions, and the
Court continued to examine the meaning and context of religious
doctrines and practices in determining numerous cases.
That changed in 1990, with the Court’s decision in Smith v.
Employment Division, which holds that courts may not examine or
weigh the importance of religious practices in determining whether
an individual’s rights to the free exercise of religion were violated.
Smith’s conclusion has been understood by the lower courts to
evince an absolute prohibition on judicial examination of religious
questions. Applying that prohibition, state and federal courts have
dismissed scores of otherwise ordinary disputes—involving
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consumer fraud, child custody, employment discrimination,
negligence, professional malpractice, and contracts—whenever
their resolution would require any analysis of religious questions.
A. The Common Law Origins of the Prohibition on Judicial
Examination of Religious Questions
The principle that civil courts have no authority to adjudicate
religious disputes dates back to medieval England, when church
courts and crown courts existed side by side and had relatively
distinct areas of jurisdiction. As Roscoe Pound described:
In the politics and law of the Middle Ages the
distinction between the spiritual and the temporal,
between the jurisdiction of religiously organized
Christendom and the jurisdiction of the temporal
sovereign, that is, of a politically organized
society, was fundamental. It seemed as natural
and inevitable to have church courts and state
courts, each with their own field of action and
each, perhaps, tending to encroach on the other’s
domain, but each having their own province in
which they were paramount, as it seems to
Americans to have two sets of courts, federal
courts and state courts, operating side by side in
the same territory, each supreme in their own
province.22
Under the dual legal system in place in medieval England,
common law courts, under the domain of the king, had jurisdiction
over temporal matters and lacked authority to decide religious
questions because such questions properly fell under the
jurisdiction of the church and its own system of canon courts.
22
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The longstanding division of authority between the crown’s
courts and the church courts formed the background for the
rejection in the seventeenth and eighteenth century of civil
authority over questions of faith. John Locke argued that civil
courts have no authority to measure religious truth because such
matters fell under the authority of religious bodies and the
individual conscience: “And upon this ground, I affirm that the
magistrate’s power extends not to the establishing of any articles of
faith, or forms of worship, by the force of his laws.”23 This
principle was generally accepted throughout the American
colonies. Roger Williams thus wrote in 1644 that civil courts have
no authority to judge the truth of religious convictions: “All civil
states with their officers of justice, in their respective constitutions
and administrations, are . . . essentially civil, and therefore not
judges, governors, or defenders of the Spiritual, or Christian, State
and worship.”24 James Madison likewise relied on what was by
then a well-established principle in his “Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,” declaring the
proposition that a “Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of
Religious truth” to be “an arrogant pretension falsified by the
contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the
world.”25
Pursuant to the principle that civil courts have no authority
over religious matters, nineteenth century courts refused to address
the truth of religious doctrines,26 to decide whether the Christian
sacraments had been properly administered,27 to enforce spiritual
obligations,28 or to compel church officials to perform religious
23
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duties.29 When such questions about religion arose, the courts
deferred to the final decisions of religious authorities, just as the
common law courts of England would have deferred to church
courts on matters within their jurisdiction.
In ways that plainly would be anathema under contemporary
understandings of the place of religion in law, American courts in
the nineteenth century understood the bar on examining the truth of
religious doctrines to be necessary to protect the dominant position
of Christianity. Christianity was said to be part of the common law
and, as a result, the truth of Christian doctrines could not be
challenged in court.30 Blasphemy against Christianity and the
Christian Bible remained a common law crime until the early
twentieth century, and convictions were upheld for calling Jesus a
bastard,31 for characterizing the Bible to be a fable,32 and for
publishing a satire of the New Testament.33 Alleged blasphemers

29
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Thomas, Christianity, 15A Am. Jur. 2d Common Law § 8 (“[I]t has been said
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31
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note 30. Blasphemy was understood to be a secular crime, not a religious
offense, because public ridicule of Christianity was seen as a threat to the peace
due to Christianity’s dominant position. See, e.g., Updegrath, 11 Serg. & R. at
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insult on which would be indictable, as directly tending to disturb the peace”);
Torpey, supra note 29, at 59 (“Blasphemy is a temporal offense. Violation of
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could not defend themselves on the ground that they had spoken
the truth.34 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in 1824,
if the truth of Christian beliefs were open to attack in court, no
testimony could be credited because of the requirement that
witnesses swear an oath of truthfulness on the Christian Bible:
[A]ll false oaths, all tests by oath, in the common
form, by the book, would cease to be indictable as
perjury; the indictment must state the oath to be
on the holy Evangelists of Almighty God; the
accused, on his trial, might argue that the book by
which he was sworn, so far from being holy writ,
was a pack of lies, containing as little truth as
Robinson Crusoe. And is every jury in the box to
decide as a fact, whether the scriptures are of
divine origin?35
Judicial examination of the validity of Christian teachings was thus
prohibited because the truth of Christian doctrine was understood
to be an unchallengeable foundation of the law.
The principle that courts could not delve into religious
questions did not, however, preclude judicial pronouncements on
the falsity of religious doctrines and practices outside mainstream
Christianity. For instance, in 1922 an Oklahoma prosecution for
fortune telling was upheld against a practitioner of Spiritualism,
notwithstanding the defendant’s claim that her religion involved
the practice of communicating with departed spirits.36 The court
rejected the contention that communicating with spirits was a
protected form of religious freedom, describing the defendant’s
avowed religion as a “system of speculative philosophy, attended

religious precepts will not be punished as such. Punishment follows because
such attacks tend to destroy the peace of society.”).
34
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35
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justice to be sworn by an oath which recognizes deity”).
36
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with superstitious credulity and . . . tinged with hypocrisy.37 Other
courts characterized claims of supernatural abilities to contact the
dead, or to heal illnesses through psychic powers, to be
fraudulent,38 as something only lunatics could believe.39
In addition to protecting the dominant role of Christianity, the
reluctance of nineteenth-century courts to resolve religious
questions served the Madisonian goal of maintaining the distinct
spheres of religion and law. In 1872, in Watson v. Jones, the
Supreme Court held, as a matter of federal common law, that
courts should not resolve property disputes between rival church
bodies by reference to religious doctrines.40 The case arose as a
result of a schism among a church’s members over the issue of
slavery, which resulted in two competing groups claiming
ownership of the church property. The Supreme Court overturned
the lower court’s ruling that the property belonged to the group
that more closely followed the original teachings of the church. In
reaching this conclusion, Watson speaks in terms of the relative
jurisdictions of the civil courts and religious authorities, stating
that “civil courts exercise no jurisdiction” over disputes that are
“strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character,” because such
matters must be left to church authorities to resolve.41
In ruling that the property dispute should not be decided based
on a court’s assessment of the litigants’ relative adherence to
church doctrines, Watson emphasizes that courts are not absolutely
barred from examining religious doctrines in other contexts. The
Court contrasted judicial reliance on religious doctrine in deciding
37

Ibid.; but see id. at 570 (Matson, J., concurring) (“Can the state
constitutionally prohibit communication with the spirit world, which, so far as I
am advised, we are at peace?”).
38
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39
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a prosecution against a practitioner of spiritual healing in which the government
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to heal diseases through mental powers alone); see generally Gregory G. Sarno,
Regulation of Astrology, Clairvoyancy, Fortunetelling, and the Like, 91
A.L.R.3d 766 (1979).
40
13 U.S. (Wall.) 679 (1872).
41
Id. at 733.
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a dispute between competing church sects and the hypothetical
case of a “pious man” who placed property in trust in a written
instrument specifying that it be used by a congregation committed
to Trinitarian Christian. In the latter case, the Watson Court stated,
courts should be available to “prevent that property from being
used as a means of support and dissemination of the Unitarian
doctrine.”42 A court’s duty in that hypothetical case would be “to
inquire whether the party accused of violating the trust is holding
or teaching a different doctrine.”43 Watson thus holds that fidelity
to religious doctrines cannot serve as a rule of decision for
adjudicating property disputes but courts may nonetheless inquire
into questions of religious doctrine and practice when such
questions arise in the ordinary course of litigation and do not
require judgments about the relative merits of religious claims.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American law had
thus developed a common law principle that the civil courts had no
authority over religious matters, and the courts therefore should
avoid resolving religious questions in deference to proper church
authorities. This principle had limited applications: it prevented
courts from directly meddling in the internal affairs of mainstream
Christian churches and prevented parties from challenging the truth
of Christian doctrines. The principle did not prevent courts from
declaring non-Christian religious claims to be false, nor was it not
understood to prevent courts from making factual inquiries into
religious doctrines and practices, Christian and otherwise, when
such questions arose in the ordinary course of litigation and did not
call on courts to make judgments about the merits of religious
doctrines and practices.
B. The Expansion of the Prohibition Against Judicial Resolution
of Religious Questions
Beginning with United States v. Ballard,44 decided in 1944,
the Supreme Court issued a series of cases that constitutionalized
42
43
44
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and greatly expanded the principle that courts should not delve into
questions of religious doctrine. In Ballard, the Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause bars courts from determining the validity or
truth of religious claims or doctrines. In 1969, in Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church,45 the Court announced a much more sweeping rule that
the Establishment Clause bars factual inquiry into the content of
religious doctrines or practices, either to interpret religious
doctrine or to determine the relative importance or centrality of a
particular religious belief or practice to a believer. Over the twenty
years following Presbyterian Church, the Court did not apply that
rule literally and continued to inquire into the content and context
of religious doctrines and practices in cases under the Free
Exercise Clause and other areas. That changed in 1990, when the
Court relied on the broad prohibition against judicial inquiry into
religious questions in Employment Division v. Smith to
substantially revise Free Exercise doctrine.
1. United States v. Ballard: The Constitutional Prohibition on
Judicial Assessment of Religious Truths. — Ballard arose out of
charges of mail fraud against followers of Guy Ballard, founder of
the “I Am” movement.46 According to the indictment, members of
the I Am movement mailed literature in which they claimed that
Ballard had been chosen by Saint Germain to transmit divine
messages to mankind, that the tracts of the I Am movement had
been dictated directly by Jesus, and that, by virtue of his
supernatural attainments, Ballard possessed the power to cure
diseases and heal injuries.47 The indictment alleged that Ballard’s
followers knew these claims to be false and made them in order to
swindle people of their money.48 The court of appeals ruled that
the defendants could be found guilty only if the jury determined
that the defendants’ claims were factually false.
45

393 U.S. 440 (1969).
A fascinating examination of the factual background to the Ballard
case and the history of the I Am movement can be found in John T. Noonan, Jr.,
THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 141-156 (1998); see also Weiss, supra note 12.
47
322 U.S. at 79-80.
48
Id. at 80.
46
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Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the Religion
Clauses prohibit any inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious
claims:
The religious views espoused by respondents may
seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most
people. But if these doctrines are subject to trial
before a jury charged with finding their truth or
falsity, then the same can be done with the
religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of
fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden
domain. . . . The miracles of the New Testament,
the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power
of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of
many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in
a hostile environment found those teachings false,
little indeed would be left of religious freedom.49
The Supreme Court held that the defendants could be convicted of
fraud if they did not sincerely believe their religious claims,
without any inquiry by the jury into the truth of those claims.50
Ballard thus announces that the Constitution cordons off a
“forbidden domain” that courts may not enter: courts may not
determine the truth or falsity of religious claims. Although Ballard
is consistent with the earlier common law prohibition on judicial
resolution of religious questions, it locates a constitutional source
for the prohibition—the protection accorded by the Free Exercise
Clause to individuals against punishment by the government for
holding religious beliefs offensive to the majority.
2. The Church Property Cases: The Constitutional
Prohibition on Judicial Examination of Religious Doctrines. —
In a series of cases addressing church property disputes, the Court
49

Id.. at 87-88.
Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that allowing a conviction
based on insincerity does not adequately protect religious freedom. In Jackson’s
view, the question of whether a defendant acted sincerely in making a religious
claim cannot be sufficiently distinguished from the truth of the claim. For a
discussion of the problems associated with ascertaining religious sincerity, see
John T. Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988
University of Ill. L. Rev. 713; see also Weiss, supra note 12.
50
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constitutionalized and expanded the rule announced in Watson v.
Jones that courts should not resolve property disputes between
competing church factions by reference to religious doctrines.51
The leading case, Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,52 arose as a result of a schism
in the Presbyterian Church, in which title to a church was claimed
both by the national church body and by the local church
organization, which had broken with the national church over its
decision to ordain women. The property dispute made its way to
the Georgia Supreme Court, which applied its longstanding rule
that church property is held in trust for the central church
organization as long as it adheres to the original church doctrines.53
The Georgia court awarded the property to the local church on the
ground that the national church body had substantially departed
from its doctrines by allowing the ordination of women. The
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “First Amendment values
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to
turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious
doctrine and practice.”54
At the level of its holding, Presbyterian Church simply
restates Watson v. Jones, rejecting Georgia’s departure-fromdoctrine rule, which allowed a court faced with a property dispute
between church factions to favor the church body that more closely
adhered to the church’s original theological doctrines. Such a
substantive rule of decision amounted to a governmental
endorsement of one set of religious factions—conservative
factions—at the expense of progressive factions, violating the
principle of neutrality that the law “is committed to the support of
51

See generally Robert J. Bohner, Note, Religious Property Disputes and
Intrinsically Religious Evidence: Towards a Narrow Application of the Neutral
Principles Approach, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 949 (1990); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church
Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 Fordham L.
Rev. 335 (1986).
52
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
53
Although the departure-from-doctrine rule had been rejected in Watson,
that decision was based on federal common law and was binding on federal
courts only.
54
Id. at 449.
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no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”55 Yet, in rejecting the
departure-from-doctrine rule, the Court’s decision in Presbyterian
Church appears to adopt a broad rule that the Religion Clauses bar
any judicial inquiry into religious doctrines: “[T]he departurefrom-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires
the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion—
the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance
of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment
forbids civil courts from playing such a role.”56 The Court thus
characterized judicial examination of religious questions as the
“forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church
doctrine.”57
In Presbyterian Church and the subsequent church property
cases, the Court embraced a prohibition on judicial interpretation
of religious doctrine in order to foreclose the possibility that a
court might rule that an authoritative doctrinal decision of a
religious body is incorrect. In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, the Court overturned the judgment of the Illinois
Supreme Court that local church property belonged to the
American branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church rather than to
the mother church in Yugoslavia. As the Court stated, the fatal
flaw of the Illinois court was that its decision “rests upon an
impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues
in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into
church polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes.”58
These cases can be understood simply to reject the power of courts
to disagree with the religious judgment of church bodies.
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80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728; see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (the Establishment Clause
expresses a conviction “requiring on the part of all organs of government a strict
neutrality toward theological questions”).
56
Id. at 450.
57
Id. at 451; see also id. at 440 (holding that the First Amendment
prohibits civil courts from “assessing the relative significance to the religion” of
a particular religious tenet).
58
426 U.S. 696, 708 (1976)
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The language of the decisions, however, goes much farther in
rejecting judicial examination of religious doctrines. In a oneparagraph concurrence in Presbyterian Church, Justice Harlan
sough to make clear that the Court’s opinion should not be read to
preclude a court from interpreting and enforcing legal documents
containing religious terms, at least where such terms are express
and clear.59 In holding out the possibility that a court could
construe religious terms appearing in deeds or wills, Harlan relied
on Watson’s hypothetical of the “pious man.”60 Cases following
Presbyterian Church, however, eliminate any residual authority for
courts to construe religious terms, however clearly expressed.61
The Court approved two methods for resolving church property
disputes, both of which entail “no inquiry into religious
doctrine,”62 and “no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the
ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.”63 Courts may
either adopt a policy of deference to the church institution with
authority to decide the property question and underlying religious
doctrinal questions or courts may decide the property dispute by
applying “neutral principles of law” that do not entail any
consideration of religious doctrinal matters.64
59

Id. at 453 (“I do not, however, read the Court’s opinion to go further to
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids civilian courts from enforcing a
deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down conditions limiting a
religious organization’s use of the property which is granted.”) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
60
Ibid.
61
See Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch., 396 U.S. 367, 369 n.2
(1970) (Brennan, J. concurring) (“Only express conditions that may be effected
without consideration of doctrine are civilly enforceable.”).
62
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1978).
63
Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J. concurring).
64
See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708 (1976) (“For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without
extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decision
of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal with a church of hierarchical polity, but
must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the
religious issues of doctrine or polity between them.”); Jones, 443 U.S. at 603
(“The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust
and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil
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In the broad form articulated by the Court in these cases, the
prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions goes far
beyond both the common law prohibition and the rule announced
in Ballard. Whereas Ballard prohibits courts from judging the
truth of religious doctrines, the church property cases bar courts
from making any “inquiry” into religious doctrines, from
“interpreting” religious doctrines, and from determining the
“importance” of religious doctrine to believers. The church
property cases further alter the constitutional source of the
prohibition. Whereas Ballard is based principally on free exercise
principles, the broad prohibition on judicial examination of
religious questions articulated in the church property cases is
grounded primarily on Establishment Clause principles, in that
examination of religious questions is said to involve excessive
entanglement with religion and to be constitutionally assigned to
religious authorities.65 The church property cases thus depart
substantially from Watson, which had announced that religious
bodies “come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary
associations.”66 In announcing that courts may not purport to
resolve religious questions, the church property cases announce a
rule uniquely applicable to religious entities.
3. Thomas, Hernandez, and County of Allegheny: Confusion
Over the Permissible Scope of Judicial Examination of Religious
Questions. — Although the church property cases broadly declare
that courts must not engage in the “forbidden process of
courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity,
and practice.”).
65
See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
There is some dispute among
commentators regarding which of the two Religion Clauses form the basis for
the church property cases. Compare Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1392-1996 (1981)
(arguing that the church property cases rest on the Free Exercise Clause because
“the primary constitutional violation [is] interfering with the right of the original
church, which included both factions, to resolve the controversy itself.”) with
Tribe, supra note 14 (discussing the church property cases as Establishment
Clause cases) and Esbeck, supra note 14 at 42-58 (arguing that the church
property cases are based on the separationist principles of the Establishment
Clause).
66
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 714.
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interpreting and weighing church doctrine,”67 in the first twenty
years after issuing those opinions, the Court continued to consider
and weigh the importance of religious doctrines and practices in its
analysis of cases under the Religion Clauses. The rule against
judicial review of religious matters appeared to be another instance
of what the Court candidly recognized as its tendency to make
overly broad pronouncements in cases under the Religion
Clauses.68
The Court frequently examined the content of religious
doctrines and practices in Free Exercise Clause cases. Until Smith,
the Court applied a compelling interest test in evaluating free
exercise challenges to the application of neutral governmental
laws, requiring courts to assess the significance of the burden on
the plaintiff’s religious practice and weigh that burden against the
strength of the government’s interest in applying the neutral law to
the challenger. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held
that Wisconsin’s compulsory education requirement violated the
free exercise rights of the Old Order Amish because the Amish
religion prohibited sending teenagers to public schools.69 In order
to reach that conclusion, the Court gave careful examination to the
doctrines and practices of Amish religion, noting the “strong
evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating [the
Amish’s] entire mode of life,” and describing the biblical
command “Be not conformed to this world” to be “fundamental to
the Amish faith.”70 Under the Court’s free exercise cases, judicial
examination of the content and significance of religious practices
was an essential aspect of the constitutional test.

67

393 U.S. at 451; see also id. at 440 (holding that the First Amendment
prohibits civil courts from “assessing the relative significance to the religion” of
a particular religious tenet).
68
See Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970) (“The considerable
inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may
have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear
in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general
principles.”).
69
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
70
Id. at 219.
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In several cases following the church property case, the Court
grappled with the contradiction of both requiring and prohibiting
judicial examination of religious doctrines and practices. For
instance, Thomas v. Review Board involved the free exercise rights
of a Jehovah’s Witness who was denied unemployment
compensation after quitting his job, claiming that his religious
beliefs forbade him from participating in military production.71 To
establish that the denial of benefits burdened his religion, Thomas
was required to present some evidence about the content of his
religion—in the words of the Court, to show that he “terminated
his work because of an honest conviction that such work was
forbidden by his religion.”72 The state attempted to rebut Thomas’s
characterization of his religious beliefs by demonstrating that the
Jehovah’s Witnesses do not actually forbid military work, offering
testimony of one of Thomas’s co-workers and fellow Jehovah’s
Witness. The Court, however, held that assessing the content of
Jehovah’s Witness doctrine was beyond the constitutional
competence of the judiciary: “Particularly in this sensitive area, it
is not within the judicial function and competence to inquire
whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly
perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”73
The contradiction in the Court’s requirement that free exercise
plaintiffs demonstrate a burden on their religious beliefs or
practices while simultaneously prohibiting judicial examination of
the content and importance of religious beliefs and practices can be
seen most clearly in the course of a single paragraph in the Court’s
opinion in Hernandez v. Commissioner.74 That case involved the
disallowance of tax deductions for “auditing” and training sessions
mandated by Church of Scientology teachings. In addressing the
claim that the disallowance violated the taxpayers’ free exercise
rights, the Court articulated the constitutional test as follows: “The
free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a
substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief
71
72
73
74

450 U.S. 707 (1981).
Id. at 716.
Ibid.
490 U.S. 680 (1989).
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or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest
justifies the burden.”75 The Court apparently recognized that
requiring proof that a religious practice is “central” to the
plaintiff’s religion might be understood to call for judicial
examination of the content and importance of religious beliefs and
practices, as the next sentence in the opinion seeks to forbid such
examination: “It is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.”76 The next
two sentences of the opinion, however, demonstrate that the Court
was nonetheless willing to makes its own assessment of the
doctrines and teachings of the Church of Scientology: “We do,
however, have doubts whether the alleged burden imposed by the
deduction disallowance on the Scientologists’ practices is a
substantial one. Neither the payment nor the receipt of taxes is
forbidden by the Scientology faith generally, and Scientology does
not proscribe the payment of taxes in connection with auditing or
training sessions specifically.”77
Hernandez thus appears to hold that (1) free exercise plaintiffs
must demonstrate that a burdened religious practice or belief is
central to his or her religion, but (2) a court cannot determine
whether the practice or belief actually is central to the plaintiff’s
religion, yet (3) courts may nonetheless assess whether the
plaintiff’s religion would consider the burden imposed by the
challenged governmental action to be substantial. If nothing else,
Hernandez demonstrates that the Court remained baffled over the
extent to which judicial inquiry is allowed into religious doctrines
and practices.
In the same term that Hernandez was decided, the Court
expressed similar ambivalence about whether it should decide
Establishment Clause cases without examining religious doctrines.
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a display of a crèche in a county courthouse
and a menorah in a local government building.78 In deciding
75
76
77
78

Id. at 699 (emphasis added).
Ibid.
Id. at 699.
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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whether these displays violated the Establishment Cause, the Court
devoted considerable attention to the religious meaning and
content of the displays. The majority opinion parsed the phrase
appearing on the crèche—“Glory to God in the Highest”—to
express the sectarian sentiment “Glory to God because of the birth
of Jesus.”79 The majority concluded that “[t]his praise to God in
Christian terms is indisputably religious.”80 Based on its
conclusion that the crèche conveyed a “patently Christian
message,” the majority found that its display on public property
violates the Establishment Clause. Likewise, in considering the
constitutionality of the display of the menorah, Justice Blackmun’s
concurring opinion examined voluminous evidence, including
expert testimony, regarding the religious meaning of the
menorah.81 Dissenting on the unconstitutionality of the display of
the crèche and concurring on the constitutionality of the display of
the menorah, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Scalia, criticized the Court for undertaking
the “inappropriate task of saying what every religious symbol
means. . . . This Court is ill equipped to sit as a national theology
board, and I question both the wisdom and the constitutionality of
its so doing.”82 Justice Blackmun defended his examination of the
religious meaning of the menorah, stating that “[a]ny inquiry
concerning the government’s use of a religious object . . . requires
a review of the factual record concerning the religious object.”83
The Court thus expressed division over whether it is
constitutionally appropriate for a court to examine the content of
religious doctrines and practices in deciding cases under the
Establishment Clause.
4. Employment Division v. Smith: The Reshaping of the Free
Exercise Clause to Avoid Examination of Religious Doctrines and
Practices. — Although the opinions issued by the Court in the
first two decades following the church property cases express
considerable ambivalence over whether courts are constitutionally
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 598.
Ibid.
Id. at 613-621.
Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 614 n.60 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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allowed to examine the content, meaning, and importance of
religious doctrines and practices, none of the cases in those
decades appears to take literally the church property cases’ broad
pronouncements of an absolute prohibition on judicial examination
of religious doctrines and practices. That changed with the Court’s
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, issued the term
following Hernandez and County of Allegheny. Smith broadly
holds that courts are constitutionally barred from making any
factual inquiries into the content or significance of religious
doctrines and practices and that, as a result, the standard for
deciding free exercise cases cannot depend on the significance of
religious doctrines and practices in the context of a religion.
In Smith, the Court overturned the compelling interest test
applied in cases like Yoder in large part because it required courts
to determine the significance of religious practices and doctrines.84
As the Court stated, “we have warned that courts must not presume
to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion.”85
Because courts must not determine the religious significance of an
allegedly burdened practice, the Court concluded that, “[i]f the
‘compelling interest’ test is to be applied at all . . . it must be
applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously
commanded.”
The Court thus announced that courts are
constitutionally barred from distinguishing religious practices and
doctrines that are central to a religion from those that are trivial—
in the example of the Court, the Free Exercise Clause cannot be
read to offer differing degrees of protection to the practice of
throwing rice at weddings than to the wedding ceremony itself.86
Because courts are constitutionally barred from determining the
significance of religious practices, they cannot balance the
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Cf. Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Living in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 59 (1993) (Smith “is a decision about institutional arrangements more
than substantive merits . . . holding that judicially manageable standards for the
resolution of Free Exercise exemption claims are lacking.”).
85
494 U.S. at 887.
86
Id. at 887 n.4.
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significance of a governmental interest against the significance of a
burdened religious practice.87
In disagreeing with the majority’s rejection of the compelling
interest test, both the concurring and dissenting Justices agreed
with the majority’s conclusion that it is constitutionally
impermissible for a court to determine the importance of a
religious practice within the context of a religion.88 The most
prominent academic critics and defenders of the decision similarly
agreed that the Free Exercise Clause does not require courts to
determine the religious centrality of religious doctrines and
practices.89
Smith thus confirms that the prohibition against judicial
examination of religious questions articulated in the church
property cases should be understood to be broad and absolute.
Whereas the church property cases applied the prohibition to
invalidate a rule of decision calling for examination of religious
87

494 U.S. at 889 n.5 (“[I]t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges
will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of
a religious practice.”).
88
Id. at 906-907 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 919 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
89
For instance, Douglas Laycock, a vocal critic of Smith, agreed with the
Court that “[a] threshold requirement of centrality would indeed be a mistake.”
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 32; see
also Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution of Issues About Religious Conviction,
81 Marq. L. Rev. 461, 469 (1998) (“I am skeptical about the usefulness of
requiring a ‘central belief or practice.”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1148 (1990) (“[A]
court faced with a free exercise claim is not required to determine, in the
abstract . . . how central a religious practice is.”); Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and
Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 Neb. L. Rev.
651, 668 (1991) (“Judicial inquiry into such matters as how important a specific
religious tenet is for a believer or how heavily the government imposed burden
affects a particular individual’s adherence to his religious precepts places the
courts in an undesirably intrusive posture.”). Similarly, Ira Lupu, generally
supportive of Smith, agreed with the Court that “any imaginable process for
resolving disputes over centrality creates the spectre of religious experts giving
conflicting testimony about the significance of a religious practice, with the
state’s decisionmaker choosing among them.” Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin:
The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
933, 959 (1989).

IS THERE A “RELIGIOUS QUESTION” DOCTRINE?

27

doctrines to decide property disputes, Smith applies the prohibition
to cases arising under the Free Exercise Clause, holding that even
in deciding cases about religious freedom, courts cannot examine
the religious content of the practices and doctrines at issue. As the
lower courts were quick grasp, if the content and significance of
religious practices cannot be examined in addressing the scope of
religious freedom, examination of the content and significance of
religious practices and doctrine must be off-limits in all cases in
which such questions could conceivably arise.
C. “This Court Is Constitutionally Barred from Inquiring into the
Meaning of These Words”: The Application of an Absolute
Prohibition on Judicial Inquiry into Religious Questions in the
Lower Courts
In 1872, in deciding Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court
stated that cases involving religious questions were “happily rare
in our courts.”90 Since the Court’s decision in Smith, however,
there have been scores of cases that state and federal courts have
characterized as raising religious questions prohibited to judicial
inquiry. The lower courts assume that Smith and the church
property cases establish an absolute prohibition and routinely
dismiss any case that would require judicial inquiry into the
content or significance of religious beliefs and practices. As
Laurence Tribe uncritically stated, “American judicial decisions
have tended to treat anything even resembling inquiry into
[religious questions] as part of the forbidden religious realm.”91
The expanded prohibition on judicial examination of religious
questions has led state and federal courts to dismiss disputes in
seemingly every area of litigation—including consumer fraud,
child custody and divorce, employment discrimination, torts,
professional malpractice, and contracts—whenever their resolution
would require analysis of religious questions. It has also led courts
to construe statutes to avoid requiring any inquiry into religious

90
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Watson v. Jones , 13 U.S. (Wall.) 679, 713 (1872).
Tribe, supra note 14 at § 14-11 at 1236 n.67.
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questions and to invalidate statutes that require such inquiry.
Below is a representative sampling of the cases.
1. Contract cases. — In numerous cases, contracts have been
deemed unenforceable because they contain religious terms that
courts have held they are barred from construing. For instance, in
Elmora Hebrew Center v. Fishman, the New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal of a breach of contract action involving
a contract requiring a rabbi to “perform all normal rabbinical duties
incumbent upon a Rabbi of a traditional Jewish Congregation.”92
As the Court held, judicial construction of the contract would
require the court to make “incursions into religious questions that
would be impermissible under the first amendment.”93 Similarly,
in Pearson v. Church of God, a retired minister argued that he was
entitled to a pension under the terms of the pension agreement
because he maintained a “ministry” even though his “pastoral
license” had been revoked.94 Concluding that the relevant terms in
the pension agreement were religious, the court dismissed the case,
stating that “this court is constitutionally barred from inquiring into
the meaning of these words.”95 Courts thus profess a complete
inability to construe the meaning of religious terms and dismiss
any contract action calling for construction of such terms.96
92

593 A.2d 725, 727 (N.J. 1991).
Id. at 730.
94
458 S.E.2d 68 (S.Car. Ct. App. 1995).
95
Id. at 70.
96
See also Basich v. Bd of Pensions, 540 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (dismissing breach of contact action); Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical
Lutheran Church, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Lindsey E.
Blenkhorn, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: Interpreting Mahr
Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 189 (2002); Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in
Halacha, Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 Md. L. Rev. 312 (1992);
Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial
Agreements, 32 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 359 (1999); David J. Overstreet,
Note, Does the Bible Preempt Contract Law?: A Critical Examination of
Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a Cleric’s Breach of Contract Claim Against
a Religious Organization, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 263 (1996); Jodi M. Solovy,
Comment, Civil Enforcement of Jewish Marriage and Divorce: Constitutional
Accommodation of a Religious Mandate, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 493 (1996);
Lawrence M. Warmflash, The New York Approach to Enforcing Religious
93
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2. Family law cases. — Questions about religion frequently
arise in child custody cases, when one parent attempts to use the
other parent’s religion against him or her. In many cases, one
parent has argued that the other practices a religion that is not in
the best interests of the child, but the courts have generally refused
to examine a parent’s religion except when presented with clear
evidence that particular religious practices pose a threat to the life
of the child.97 In other cases, courts have refused to determine
whether a custodial parent violated prenuptial or divorce
agreements mandating that children be raised according to the
commands of a particular religion.98 For instance, Zummo v.
Zummo, involved the construction of a divorce order prohibiting
the husband from taking the children “to religious services
contrary to the Jewish faith.”99 After the father took the children to
Catholic services, the mother sought to enforce the order, but the
Pennsylvania Superior Court held the dispute nonjusticiable:
The father is prohibited from taking his children
to “religious services contrary to the Jewish
faith.” What constitutes a “religious service”?
Marriage Contracts: From Avitzur to the Get Statute, 50 Brook. L. Rev. 229
(1984).
97
See generally George G. Blum, Annotation, Religion as Factor in
Visitation Cases, 95 A.L.R.5th 533 (2002); Thomas J. Cunningham,
Considering Religion As a Factor in Foster Care in the Aftermath of
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 53 (1994); Jordan C.
Paul, “You Get the House. I Get the Car. You Get the Kids. I Get Their Souls.”
The Impact of Spiritual Custody Awards on the Free Exercise Rights of
Custodial Parents, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 583 (1989); Karel Rocha, Should
Religious Upbringing Antenuptial Agreements Be Legally Enforceable?, 11 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 145 (2000); Jocelyn E. Strauber, Note, A Deal Is a Deal:
Antenuptial Agreements Regarding the Religious Upbringing of Children Should
Be Enforceable, 47 Duke L.J. 971 (1998); Martin Weiss and Robert Abramoff,
The Enforceability of Religious Upbringing Agreements, 25 John Marshall L.
Rev. 655 (1992).
98
See Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997); Zummo v.
Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1990); Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 339 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996); see generally Martin Weiss and Robert Abramoff, The
Enforceability of Religious Upbringing Agreements, 25 John Marshall L. Rev.
655 (1992).
99
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1142 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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Which are “contrary” to the Jewish faith? What
for that matter is the “Jewish” faith? Orthodox,
Conservative,
Reform,
Reconstructionist,
Messianic, Humanistic, Secular and other Jewish
sects might differ widely on this point. . . . Both
the subject matter and the ambiguities of the order
make excessive entanglement in religious matters
inevitable if the order is to be enforced.100
The court thus held that religious upbringing agreements are
unenforceable because it is constitutionally impermissible for
courts to determine what practices are consistent or inconsistent
with religious faiths.
3. Tort cases. — Courts have refused to adjudicate negligence
claims against churches, religious therapists, and faith healers
whenever the reasonableness of an actor’s conduct can be said to
depend in any measure on religious standards.101 For instance,
100

Id. at 1146.
See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(dismissing a malpractice claim against pastor for allegedly touching twelve
year old girl during pastoral counsel, holding that adjudicating a clergy
malpractice claim would unconstitutionally “require the Court or jury to define
and express the standard of care to be followed by other reasonable Presbyterian
clergy of the community”); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988)
(dismissing clergy malpractice claim); DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ,
890 P.2d 214, 222 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a cleric could not be held
liable for malpractice if his massage of the minor plaintiff “was engaged in
solely in a sincere effort to facilitate the minor’s communication with God”);
Korean Presbyterian Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)
(dismissing tort of outrage claim brought against church for statements made
during excommunication); see also Martin R. Bartel, Clergy Malpractice After
Nally: “Touch Not My Anointed, and to My Prophets Do No Harm,” 35 Vill. L.
Rev. 535 (1990); Constance Frisby Fain, Clergy Malpractice: Liability for
Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 Miss. C. L. Rev. 97 (1991); C.
Eric Funston, Note, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the
Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 Cal. W. L. Rev. 507 (1983); Sue Ganske
Graziano, Clergy Malpractice, 12 Whittier L. Rev. 349 (1991); Scott C.
Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional
Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219 (2000); James K. Lehman, Note, Clergy
Malpractice: A Constitutional Approach, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 459 (1990); Jeremy
Pomeroy, Note, Reason, Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: When Faith
and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1111 (1992); Kelly Beers
101
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courts have held negligence claims against religious counselors
and spiritual healers to be nonjusticiable because they would
require courts to undertake prohibited inquiry into the standard of
care applicable to religious counselors.102 Similarly, courts have
held that they cannot adjudicate claims that a church negligently
hired or supervised a priest accused of molesting children because
the standard of care applicable to a church in its employment
decisions might require examination of religious doctrines.103
4. Consumer fraud cases. — Courts have held that consumer
fraud statutes prohibiting the false labeling of food to be kosher
(i.e., ritually fit for consumption under Orthodox Jewish dietary
standards) violate the Establishment Clause, among other reasons,
because the enforcement of such statutes may require courts to
determine whether food was prepared in compliance with Jewish
law.104 Although courts plainly have power to determine whether

Rouse, Note, Clergy Malpractice Claims: A New Problem for Religious
Organizations, 16 N. Ky. L. Rev. 383 (1989).
102
Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319,
1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“[A]djudication of the present case would require the
court to extensively investigate and evaluate religious tenets and doctrines: first,
to establish the standard of care of an ‘ordinary’ Christian Science practitioner;
and second, to determine whether [the defendants] deviated from those
standards. We believe that the first amendment precludes such an intrusive
inquiry by the civil courts into religious matters.”).
103
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997) (dismissing negligent
hiring claim against Catholic church); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434
(Wisc. 1997) (dismissing negligent supervision claim against Catholic church);
see generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the
Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219 (2000).
104
Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rabbi Luzer Weiss (2d
Cir. 2002); Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337
(4th Cir. 1995); Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353
(N.J. 1992); see generally Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the
Establishment Clause: Are They Kosher?, 26 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. (1992);
Karen Ruth Lavy Lindsay, Can Kosher Fraud Statutes Pass the Lemon Test?:
The Constitutionality of Current and Proposed Statutes, 23 U. Dayton L. Rev.
337 (1998); Gerald F. Masoudi, Comment, Kosher Food Regulation and the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667 (1993);
Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 951 (1997); Catherine
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food is properly labeled to be organic or low-fat, and although
older cases had upheld state kosher laws,105 all courts to address
the issue since Smith have held those laws to be unconstitutional
because they would require courts to interpret religious doctrine.
In the words of one court, to determine whether food is kosher
“would require the civil courts to engage in the forbidden process
of interpreting and weighing church doctrine.”106
5. Employment discrimination cases. — Employment
discrimination claims against religious organizations are frequently
dismissed because they might call upon courts to evaluate whether
religious doctrines played any role in the challenged employment
decision. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
religious organizations cannot be sued for discriminating on the
basis of religion, but they remain subject to liability for
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.107
When an employee brings a discrimination claim against a
religious employer, however, the employer may assert that the
challenged employment decision was not made on the prohibited
basis of race, sex, or national origin, but instead was made because
Beth Sullivan, Are Kosher Food Laws Constitutionally Kosher?, 21 B.C. Envtl.
Aff. L. Rev. 201 (1993).
105
See, e.g., People v. Goldberg, 163 N.Y.S. 663 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess.
1916).
106
Barghout, 66 F. 3d at 1337 (“To reach those questions would require
the civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing
church doctrine.”); Commack (holding that the kosher regulations “require the
State to take an official position on religious doctrine”).
107
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1; see, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs
to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate,
21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 275 (1994); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of
Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in
Conflicting Values, 43 Emory L.J. 1189 (1994); Laura L. Coon, Employment
Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the
Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions,
54 Vand. L. Rev. 481 (2001); Gayle A. Grissum, Church Employment and the
First Amendment: The Protected Employer and the Vulnerable Employee, 51
Mo. L. Rev. 911 (1986); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 391
(1987); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The
Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 Cornell L.
Rev. 1049 (1996).
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the plaintiff did not adhere to the organization’s religious
standards. Courts have ruled discrimination claims nonjusticiable
whenever religious employers raise such a defense.108 As one
court held, “Once the church states that the decision was, even in
part, doctrinal, then the court would either have to invoke the First
Amendment and cease inquiry or enter into the impermissible
activity of analyzing church doctrine and perhaps weighing the
importance of a particular area of the doctrine.”109
6. Cases involving statutory construction. — The prohibition
on judicial resolution of religious questions has led courts to
construe statutes not to require prohibited judicial inquiries into
religion and to invalidate statutes that require such inquiry. For
instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
unconstitutional a statute that prohibited employers from requiring
an employee to take action that violated his or her religious creed.
In the case that reached the Massachusetts high court, Catholic
employees objected to working on Christmas and brought suit
under the statute.110 The employer defended on the ground that
Catholicism does not require adherents to refrain from work on
Christmas. The Massachusetts court held that the dispute was not
justiciable because it would have called on a court to determine
what practices are required by Catholicism.111
108

908 P.2d 1122 (Colo. l 996); see also, e.g. Himaka v. Buddhist
Churches, 917 F. Supp 698 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing Title VII claim against
religious group because it would require examination of religious question);
Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (dismissing state
employment discrimination action).
109
Id. at 1129.
110
Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298 (Mass. 1996).
111
Similarly, a conflict in the courts arose over the scope of permissible
judicial inquiry into religious questions under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), enacted by Congress to overturn Smith, which
prohibits the government from taking actions that “substantially burden” the
exercise of religion unless the actions further a compelling state interest that
cannot be achieved by a less restrictive means. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(b). Some
courts have held that government action can be said to impose a substantial
burden on the plaintiff’s exercise of religion only when the religious practice at
issue is “mandated” by the claimant’s religion and is “central” to that religion.
See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Other courts
criticized that approach, holding that such judicially inquiry is barred by the
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II. AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION ON JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF
RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS IS NEITHER ADVISABLE NOR POSSIBLE
Before turning to an exploration of the two rationales that
have been offered to support a prohibition on judicial examination
of religious questions, this Part shows that a prohibition on judicial
inquiry and resolution of religious questions cannot feasibly be
applied in an absolute manner. In a variety of contexts, courts
routinely resolve factual questions about the content and validity of
religious doctrines and practices.
Courts make extensive
determinations about religious doctrines and practices in
determining whether they qualify as “religious” under the
Constitution and various statutes protecting and accommodating
religion. Courts also make determinations about the content of
religion in assessing a wide range of religious programs provided
by the government, such as those offered in prisons and in the
military. Furthermore, because there is no recognized test for
distinguishing secular from religious questions, courts frequently
address questions presented in secular terms in a manner that
implicitly adopts a governmental position on the validity of
religious doctrines and beliefs.
As these examples demonstrate, it is not possible to
understand the prohibition on judicial assessment of religious
questions to be absolute. Courts cannot plausibly adopt the
position characterized by Michael McConnell as “religion
blindness,” in which they would take no account of religious

Constitution, and instead adopted the conclusion that any religiously-motivated
action is protected by RFRA. See, e.g., Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179
(7th Cir. 1996); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wisc. 1996);
see generally Seeger, supra note 20. In 2000, Congress resolved the issue by
amending RFRA to provide that it protects “any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-5(7)(A). Some commentators have nonetheless argued that RFRA is
unconstitutional even as applied to the federal government because it requires
prohibited inquiry into religion. See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme
Court at Its Word: the Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56
Mont. L. Rev. 5 (1995); but see Magarian, supra note 20 at 1945-1962.
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practices and beliefs.112 Instead, the question properly to be
addressed is which religious questions courts can competently
resolve without violating the Religion Clauses.
A. Courts Examine Religious Practices and Doctrines in
Determining Whether a Practice or Doctrine Is “Religious”
Notwithstanding the apparent prohibition on judicial
examination of religious questions, courts routinely undertake
factual inquiry into religious practices and doctrines in determining
whether a set of beliefs and practices amounts to a “religion.”
Although no agreed meaning of the term “religion” has emerged
under the First Amendment, a problem that has long vexed courts
and commentators,113 courts must nonetheless decide what
constitutes a religion in construing the state and federal tax codes,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Free Exercise
Clause, state constitutions, and hundreds (if not thousands) of
112

Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a
Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 689-691 (1992) (arguing
that the Religion Clauses require accommodation of religion, not formal
neutrality). Dissenting in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 735 (1976), Justice Rehnquist recognized that a prohibition on judicial
resolution of religious disputes cannot be applied absolutely: “[W]hile there may
be a number of good arguments that civil courts . . . should, as a matter of the
wisest use of their authority, avoid adjudicating religious disputes to the
maximum extent possible, they obviously cannot avoid all such adjudications.”
See also Levine, supra note 19.
113
The closest the Court has come to adopting a test for determining what
constitutes a religion was in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 165, 176 (1965),
in which the Court employed two tests for determining religiosity in determining
conscientious objector status under the military draft law: a substantive test,
asking whether a belief is “based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to
which all else is ultimately dependent”; and a functional test, which asks
whether a belief system “occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God of those [religions] admittedly qualifying for the
exemption.” For a sampling of the large volume of academic commentary
addressing, proposing, and rejecting various tests and definitions of religion, see
Jesse Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev.
579; George C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional
Definition of “Religion,” 71 Georgetown L. Rev. 1519 (1983).
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statutes that give special treatment to religious bodies and religious
practices.114 Although determining what constitutes a religion
“may present a most delicate question,” such determinations are
necessary because, as the Court has declared, “[a] way of life,
however virtuous and admirable” is not entitled to protection under
the Religion Clauses “if it is based on purely secular
considerations.”115
Determining what constitutes a religion frequently requires
extensive factual examination of the content and scope of religious
doctrines and practices. Taking one example, in United States v.
Meyers, a defendant charged with marijuana possession claimed
that the prosecution violated his rights under RFRA because he
was a minister in the “Church of Marijuana.”116 In deciding
whether the Church of Marijuana was a bona fide religion and
therefore entitled to protection under RFRA, the court canvassed
caselaw on the meaning of the term “religion” and catalogued a set
of factors that courts have employed: (1) whether the purported
religion addresses “ultimate ideas” such as humanity’s purpose or
place in the universe; (2) whether the purported religion includes
“metaphysical beliefs,” which “address a reality which transcends
the physical and immediately apparent world”; (3) whether the
purported religion prescribes a moral or ethical system; (4)
whether the purported beliefs are “comprehensive,” in that they
seek “to provide the believer with answers to many, if not most of
the problems and concerns that confront humans”; and (5) whether
114

See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1407, 1445 (1992)
(concluding that the terms “religion” or “religious” appear over 14,000 times in
state and federal statutes, and religious exemptions appear in over 2,000
statutes); 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (providing that a person need not pay social
security taxes if he can show that “he is a member of a recognized religious sect
or division thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such
sect or division by reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to acceptance
of the benefits of any private or public insurance”); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a)(1)
(protecting Native Americans from prosecutions for peyote use if they can show
that they used peyote for “bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion”).
115
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
116
906 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Wyo. 1995).
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the purported religion includes any of the “accoutrements of
religion,” such as a founding prophet, sacred writings, sacred sites,
clergy, ceremonies, and holidays.117 The court then proceeded to
examine the beliefs and practices of the Church of Marijuana in
considerable depth, concluding that it was not a religion. Dozens
of similar cases can readily be found, in which a statutory or
constitutional right depends on judicial factfinding regarding the
content of a claimant’s religion.118
As several commentators have noted, the Constitution cannot
plausibly be construed simultaneously to require protection for
religion while forbidding courts from making assessments of
whether a doctrine or practice is religious. Gregory Magarian has
stated: “Forbidding such judgments out of concern about judicial
encroachment on religion would amount to killing free exercise
protection with kindness. By the same token, if courts could not
discern which practices are ‘religious,’ then they could not credibly
assess governmental actions under the Establishment Clause.”119
Factual inquiry into the meaning and content of religious doctrines
and practices thus cannot plausibly be prohibited as long as courts

117

Id. at 1502-1503.
See, e.g., Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that
prison policy affording prisoners a right to possess religious protected inmate’s
right to books published by the Nation of Islam, relying on expert testimony that
the books were of “crucial religious significance” and contained the essential
teachings of the Nation of Islam, without which adherents would not understand
how to pray); McBride v. Shawnee County, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Kan. 1999)
(holding that Rastafarians were not entitled to smoke marijuana in prison
because, unlike the use of peyote by certain Indian tribes, Rastafarian religion
called for marijuana use whenever the mood strikes and not in scheduled
ceremonies); Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Fla. 2003)
(examining role of prayer pipe, smudging, drums, and headbands in plaintiff’s
religion in determining free exercise claim).
119
Magarian, supra note 20, at 1960; see also Daniel O. Conkle, The Path
of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal
Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 Ind. L. J. 1, 32 (2000) (arguing that the
Court “cannot entirely escape the definitional problem—that is, as long as the
Court finds any content in the religion clauses”); cf. Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (“It cannot be ignored that the First
Amendment itself contains a religious classification.”).
118

IS THERE A “RELIGIOUS QUESTION” DOCTRINE?

38

are called upon to construe and apply the Religion Clauses and
myriads of statutes giving special treatment to religion.
B. Courts Examine Religious Questions in Assessing the
Government’s Provision of Religious Programs
The government itself provides religious services in restrictive
settings, such as prisons and the military, and in these settings the
Establishment Clause has been understood to allow (if not require)
the government to hire chaplains, serve religiously-sanctioned
food, exempt religious practitioners from otherwise applicable
rules, and generally make available religious programs to a wide
variety of religious practitioners.120 In providing for the religious
needs of military personnel and prison inmates, the government
must determine what programs are needed by different religious
communities and determine whether the programs it offers adhere
to religious standards. For instance, where a prison offers a
Passover seder for Jewish inmates, prison officials have been
called on to determine whether a prisoner actually is Jewish and
therefore entitled to attend, a quintessentially religious
determination.121 In administering chaplaincy programs and in
providing religiously sanctioned food, the government must
determine whether the food it serves and the chaplains it hires
adhere to religious law. The government could not effectively
provide religious services to inmates and military personnel
without extensive inquiry into the content of religious doctrines.

120

See generally Julie B. Kaplan, Note, Military Mirrors on the Wall:
Nonestablishment and the Military Chaplaincy, 95 Yale L.J. 1210 (1986); Jamie
Aron Forman, Note, Jewish Prisoners and Their First Amendment Right to a
Kosher Meal: An Examination of the Relationship Between Prison Dietary
Policy and Correctional Goals, 65 Brooklyn L. Rev. 477 (1999); Abraham
Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher Food,
Skullcaps, and Beards, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 241 (1994).
121
Kent Greenawalt, supra note 89 at 462.
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C. The Difficulties Distinguishing Religious from Secular
Question Make an Absolute Prohibition on Examining
Religious Questions Impossible
If there is to be a religious question doctrine, there must be
some sort of standard for determining which questions are
religious and therefore out of judicial bounds. Baker v. Carr
identifies six criteria for identifying nonjusticiable political
questions, and cases and commentary have elaborated various
formulations for each criteria.122 Not so with regard to religious
questions. Although courts routinely dismiss cases on the ground
that they would require examination of religious questions, one
searches in vain through the cases and the academic literature for
any test to distinguish religious from secular questions or even any
discussion of the need for such a test. Instead, courts and
commentators distinguish the questions that may be judicially
resolved from the prohibited category of religious questions
without any identifiable analysis.
The absence of any test for determining what questions are
religious derives only in part from the absence of an agreed
meaning of the term “religion.” Even where it is clear that a case
involves religion, it is not always clear that case raises any
religious questions. A case about the tax status of a church may
involve various questions touching on religion, such as the criteria
for church membership, the fundraising activities of the church,
and whether the church is properly characterized as a religious
entity, but not all questions involving religion are understood to be
“religious questions” that courts are barred from addressing. If all
questions touching on religion were off-limits to judicial inquiry,
religious entities and religious actions would be absolutely immune
from judicial consideration. Just as the political question doctrine
does not bar a court from considering actions described as

122

See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent
History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 643 (1989)
(describing various formulations of the political question doctrine).
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“political,” so a religious question doctrine cannot bar all
consideration of religious practices and beliefs.123
Given the undefined nature of the category of religious
questions said to be off-limits to judicial scrutiny, it is not
surprising that the same types of questions may be perceived as
religious in some contexts but secular in others. For instance,
Ballard holds that it would be unconstitutional for courts to
determine the truth or falsity of the claim that a person possesses
supernatural powers or communicates with the spirit of a deceased
saint, yet criminal defendants may be found insane or incompetent
to stand trial because they believe that they possess supernatural
powers or that they, or their victims, were possessed by demons.124
When offered as evidence of insanity, belief in spirit possession
has been unhesitatingly deemed to be “delusional” or part of a
“false belief system.”125 Rather than declaring nonjusticiable the
validity of claims of demon possession, courts rely on such claims
to establish that the defendant is suffering from mental illness and
should be committed to a mental institution. In other contexts,
courts have generally upheld government regulation of fortune
123

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217 (“The doctrine of which we treat is
one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’ The courts cannot reject
as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”).
124
See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Brown, 449 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ohio. 1983)
(declaring defendant to be insane because, at the time he killed his father, he
believed himself to be in touch with guardian angels and the devil); Stevens v.
State of Georgia, 350 S.E.2d 21 (Ga. 1986) (declaring defendant to be
“delusional” and acting under a “delusional compulsion” because he beat his
wife to death based on the belief that she was possessed by Satan and that, once
beaten, she would rise again, rid of the devil); Archie v. State of Alabama, -So.2d --, 2003 WL 559961 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2003) (declaring that
defendant was mentally ill and suffering under a “false belief system” because
she believed that God told her to kill her daughter, whom she believed was
possessed by Satan).
125
People v. Hernandez, 93 Cal. Rpt.2d 509, 517 (Cal. 2000) (defendant
“delusional” for believing that he was the “white horseman who would pass
judgment on everyone”); Mental Hygiene Legal Svcs. v. Wack, 551 N.Y.S.2d
894, 895 n.1 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant committed to mental institution
for disorder that caused him to kill his wife and son based on the belief that they
were possessed by the devil).
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telling, astrology, and communication with spirits, on the ground
that such matters do not involve religion.126 Courts offer no
analytical basis for distinguishing supernatural claims that are
religious (and therefore exempt from judicial examination) from
supernatural claims that are secular (and therefore subject to
government regulation). The distinction has meant, however, that
fraud claims may be pursued against astrologers, palm readers, and
mediums, but not against preachers and cult leaders.127
Moreover, when questions touching on religious doctrines
present themselves in what are understood to be secular contexts,
courts routinely resolve them in a manner that effectively, albeit
indirectly, amounts to a governmental declaration on the validity of
religious doctrines. This can be seen clearly in cases addressing the
constitutionality of teaching about Darwinian evolution in the
public schools. The Establishment Clause is understood to permit
the government to declare the theory of evolution to be true even
though such a declaration effectively amounts to a declaration that
some religious doctrines of creation are false.128 Questioning this
126

See generally Gregory G. Sarno, supra note 39 (collecting cases); but
see Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F.Supp. 1040 (E.D.Wis.1997) (holding
that city’s attempt to ban public fortune telling violates First Amendment free
speech clause); Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir.1998)
(holding that city’s interest in preventing fraud does not justify municipal
ordinance against fortune telling); Spiritual Psychic Church v. City of Azusa,
703 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1985) (holding that prohibition on fortune telling violates
state free speech protection).
127
Compare N.Y.Penal Law § 165.35 (McKinney 1988) (prohibiting
fortune telling for profit), with Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., 179 Cal. App. 3d 450
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that claim could not proceed challenging the
psychological techniques of the Unification Church because that would permit
the jury to question the truth of the church’s religious doctrine).
128
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987) (declaring
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute mandating the teaching of “creation
science” in public schools whenever the theory of evolution is taught). Not only
may the state teach evolution, it cannot prohibit its teaching. Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). As the Court held in Epperson v. Arkansas, the
state cannot seek to prevent the teaching of evolution on the ground that it
conflicts with the doctrine of the “divine creation of man.” 393 U.S. at 109. The
Establishment Clause does not allow a state to “blot out a particular theory
because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read.” Id. at
109.
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result, Justice Black wondered whether governmental neutrality on
religious matters might be better served by keeping the
government from saying anything on subjects addressed by
religion, such as the question of human origins:
If the theory [of evolution] is considered antireligious, as the Court indicates, how can the State
be bound by the Federal Constitution to permit its
teachers to advocate such an ‘anti-religious’
doctrine to schoolchildren? . . . .[Would] not the
removal of the subject of evolution leave the State
in a neutral position toward these supposedly
competing
religious
and
anti-religious
129
doctrines?
In Black’s view, constitutional difficulties arise not only when the
government treats religious doctrines to be true but whenever the
government advances secular theories that conflict with religious
beliefs.
Justice Black’s position has not prevailed, however, and for
good reason: the government could hardly function if it were
required to stay neutral on all subjects addressed by religious
doctrines because such subjects know no limits. Religions take
varying positions on whether human life begins at conception or at
birth, whether women should or should not work outside the home,
and whether homosexual behavior is normal or is deserving of
punishment, but the fact that religious doctrines address these
subjects has never been understood to bar the Court from holding
that, under the Constitution, human life begins at birth, that
excluding women from military schools causes identifiable societal
harms, and that criminalizing homosexual sodomy is irrational.130
Thus, notwithstanding Ballard’s rule against judging the truth or
falsity of religious claims, courts effectively may issue
governmental declarations that certain religious beliefs are false.
Indeed, the courts would be paralyzed if they could not do so.

129

Id. at 113.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558 (2003).
130
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As these examples show, it is not possible, or desirable, to
prohibit courts from examining the content of religious doctrines.
Courts do so routinely and could not, as a practical matter, avoid
doing so.
III. JUDICIAL FEAR OF THE NONRATIONAL: THE INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE OF COURTS TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
As with the political question doctrine, the prohibition on
judicial resolution of religious questions is based in large part on
the concern that courts lack the institutional competence to resolve
certain questions. That was the view of James Madison;131 it
formed the central ground for the Court’s 1872 decision in Watson
v. Jones;132 and the Court has repeatedly articulated this rationale
ever since.133 As it has recently been characterized by the Court,
however, the prohibition against deciding religious questions is
much broader than the political question doctrine, which prohibits
courts from making political decisions but does not prohibit courts
from determining what decisions have been made by the political
branches. This Part seeks to demonstrate that, while the resolution
of normative questions about religion (e.g., Is a religious belief
true or valid? Is a religious practice effective?) may frequently lie
131

Madison, supra note 15.
13 U.S. (Wall.) at 729 (“It is not to be supposed that the judges of the
civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all
these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.”).
133
See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not within
the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or
his fellow worker more correctly perceives the commands of their common
faith.”); Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“What principle of law or logic can be brought
to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his
personal faith?”); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458 (requiring courts to decide whether
litigants correctly interpret religious doctrines “would cast the Judiciary in a role
that we were never intended to play”); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S.
680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliers or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’
interpretations of those creeds.”); Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 714
n.8 (“Civil judges obviously do not have the competence of ecclesiastical
tribunals in applying the ‘law’ that govern ecclesiastical disputes.”).
132
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beyond judicial competence, positive questions about religion
(e.g., What does a religious tradition say on a particular subject? Is
a religious practice considered an important or central one in the
context of the religion?) do not exceed judicial competence, and
such questions can be resolved using ordinary tools of judicial
factfinding.
A. Judicial Incompetence to Resolve Normative Religious
Questions
Courts are said to lack competence to answer political
questions because there are no “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” for answering them.134 Courts cannot
determine whether to declare war, impose taxes, appoint officers,
or sign treaties, because such questions call for “determination[s]
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”135 The same is true
for normative questions about religion, as there are no standards
for courts to apply in deciding whether a religious belief is valid or
true, what religious practices should be followed, or how a
religious body should be organized. Such questions cannot
ordinarily be resolved using the objective, rational, and empirical
tools of law, and the Court has therefore been correct to conclude
that courts lack competence to resolve such questions.
Outside the context of religion, one is hard pressed to find a
subject matter about which courts have declared themselves
categorically incompetent to find facts. Judges and juries make
determinations on complex and arcane questions of science,
economics, and psychology, subjects for which they lack any
training. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,136 the
Court expressed great confidence in the abilities of judges and
juries to resolve such esoteric questions.137 The difficulty of
134

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
Id.
136
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
137
Daubert thus rejected the argument that abandonment of the “general
acceptance” test for the admission of scientific evidence “will result in a ‘freefor-all’ in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational
135
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answering questions has provided no basis for declaring courts
incompetent to do so.138
Given the courts’ profound confidence in their factfinding
abilities, the recognition that some questions cannot be solved
using the tools of law represents a rare expression of judicial
humility. In his dissenting opinion in Ballard, Justice Jackson
articulated this point:
If religious liberty includes, as it must, the right to
communicate [religious] experiences to others, it
seems to me an impossible task for juries to
separate fancied ones from real ones, dreams from
happenings, and hallucinations from true
clairvoyance. Such experiences, like some tones
and colors, have existence for one but none at all
for another. They cannot be verified to the minds
of those whose field of consciousness does not
include religious insight.139
In this view, religious questions lie beyond the competence of
courts because they cannot be verified through reason and

pseudoscientific assertions,” describing the argument as “overly pessimistic
about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally.” 509
U.S. at 595-596.
138
See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 623, 639-640
(1943) (“We cannot because of modest estimates of our competence in
[particular fields], withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the
function of this Court when liberty is infringed.”); Cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 613-614 n.2 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses, however, are meant to protect churches and their members
from civil law interference, not to protect the courts from having to decide
difficult evidentiary questions.”).
139
322 U.S. at 93 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Serbian Orthodox
Diocese v. Milvojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (“[I]t is the essence of
religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as
matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria.”);
see also P. Kauper, Religion and the Constitution 26 (1964) (“Not only is
religion by its nature not subject to a test of validity determined by rational
thought and empiric knowledge, but a principal purpose underlying religious
liberty is to remove the question of what is true religion from the domain of
secular authority.”).
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empirical evidence.140 Courts cannot answer religious questions
on the terms used by religions because, as Bruce Ackerman has
stated, the liberal state is “deprived of divine revelation,” and
decisions cannot be made “on the basis of some conversation with
the spirit world.”141
The institutional competence rationale for prohibiting judicial
resolution of religious questions is thus based on a conception of
legal and religious questions as requiring distinct
epistemologies.142 Judicial tools available for answering factual
and legal questions have long been understood to be limited
exclusively to the rational, objective, and empirical.143 Courts may
attempt to answer scientific questions even without scientific
training because the tools of law are consonant with those of
science.144 Judicial decisions that cannot be explained in rational
140

Cf. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 (holding that the neutral-principles approach
to resolving property disputes among religious factions “relies exclusively on
objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers
and judges.”).
141
Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 103, 127 (1980); see
also Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul
L. Rev. 1, 24 (2000) (“‘Faith’ is distinguished from ‘reason,’ and ‘reason’ is said
to be the hallmark of liberal governance.”).
142
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 141, at 24 (characterizing Madison’s
statement that a civil magistrate is not a “competent judge of Religious Truth” to
imply “an epistemic, as opposed to an institutional, basis for the special place of
religion under liberal democracy”).
143
See THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 268-269 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth
Frost eds., 1986) (quoting Aristotle as stating “Law is reason free from
passion.”); id. (quoting Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, as stating “Law is
a regulation in accord with reason.”); Coke, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (“Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing
else but reason.”); Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of
Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391, 411 (1963). (“The domain of government . .
. is that in which social problems are resolved by rational social processes, in
which men can reason together, can examine problems and propose solutions
capable of object proof or persuasion, subject to objective inquiry by courts and
electors.”); Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 789,
789 (1990) (arguing that the judicial method should be “entirely rationalistic”).
144
See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. Phil.
515, 539 (1980) (stating that factual judgments must be based on “practices of
common sense and science”); cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“[T]he word
‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.
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terms, in contrast, are not considered acceptable. For this reason,
Justice Stewart Potter’s famous dictum that defining pornography
may be impossible yet “I know it when I see it,” received
considerable derision, as it suggested that legal conclusions could
be based on gut feeling or vision, unmediated by rational
explanation.145 In contrast to ordinary questions of fact, religious
questions cannot be answered by courts because they do not
depend on the logic of law and instead may be answered on the
basis of faith, mystical experiences, miracles, or other nonrational
sources.146
The conception of law and religion as employing inherently
distinct methodologies oversimplifies both law and religion. 147 As
Larry Alexander points out, religious beliefs are frequently
grounded on the same types of evidence and reasoning as secular
beliefs. For instance, a Christian believer in God and the miracles
of the Bible may base her beliefs on the “number of witnesses,
their independently tested reliability, and the number of intelligent
people who accept these accounts as true.”148 Similar reasoning
and evidence is often used to support secular beliefs for which one
lacks first-hand observation, such as, in Professor Alexander’s
examples, the “beliefs that Washington was the first president, that
Kinshasha is the capital of Zaire, that Maris hit sixty-one home

The term ‘applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred
from such facts or accepted as truth on good grounds.”) (quoting WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
145
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Potter, J., concurring).
146
Such is the view, for instance, of Joanne Brant, who construes Smith to
be based on the proposition that “[r]eligion encompasses the mystic, spiritual
aspects of human nature, while law answers to the less esoteric demands of logic
and tradition. By this reasoning, any attempt to measure the worth of a religious
claim by the yardstick of rational argument and precedent is doomed to fail.”
Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 5, 20 (1995).
147
Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology,
30 San Diego L. Rev. 763, 768 (1993). As Professor Alexander points out,
“Some of religion’s strongest supporters load the dice against religion by
deeming it the realm of ‘faith’ as opposed to ‘reason.” Id. at 770 n.20.
148
Id. at 768.
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runs, and that the speed of light is constant.”149 Conversely, legal
analysis, like religious thinking, frequently involves certain
nonrational elements. As Paul Gewirz has argued, defending
Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” dictum, law “includes
knowledge that cannot always be explained, but that is no less
valid for that.”150 Professor Gewirz points to such nonrational
elements as imagination, courage, compassion, intuition, and
eloquence.151 Other scholars, notably Kent Greenawalt, have
argued that certain questions demanding governmental resolution,
such as abortion rights and animal rights, cannot be resolved
through reason alone and require resort to nonrational (or what he
terms “religious”) modes of thinking.152
The conclusion that religion and law do not inherently resolve
questions through distinct methodologies does not, however, mean
that courts are institutionally competent to resolve normative
religious questions, such as the validity of religious beliefs or the
proper organization of religious bodies. Religious freedom means
that decisions about religion can be made on the basis of any
methodology that seems appropriate to the individual or religious
group.153 So, while an individual may base her religious beliefs
and practices on the same types of logic and evidence available in
the courtroom, such questions need not be resolved in that way.
Religion is not unique in this respect. As Professor McConnell has
explained, there are numerous categories of secular questions that,
like religious questions, are not susceptible to judicial resolution
due to their uniquely private or idiosyncratic nature: Just as
Madison proclaimed that civil magistrates are not competent to
determine religious truths, “[t]here is no reason to suppose that the
149
150

Id. at 769.
Paul Gewirz, On “I Know It When I See It,” 105 Yale L.J. 1023, 1044

(1996).
151

Id. at 1033.
Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Law Making, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 352 (1985); see also H. Putnam, Reason, TRUTH AND HISTORY 136 (1981)
(“There is no neutral conception of rationality.”).
153
See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
714-715 (1976) (“[I]t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical
decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not
rational or measurable by objective criteria.”).
152
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civil magistrate is a competent judge of artistic merit.”154
Similarly, “religion, like love, is a judgment most of us prefer to
make for ourselves.”155 Thus, while there may be some normative
religious questions that could be resolved through resort to
ordinary judicial tools, the category is defined by its susceptibility
to resolution by modes of thinking and types of evidence outside
the ordinary range of judicial decisionmaking. As a result, the
courts have been correct to conclude that they lack institutional
competence to resolve normative religious questions.
B. Judicial Competence
Questions

to

Determine

Positive

Religious

In Smith, the Court reasoned that judicial resolution of positive
questions about religion, such as whether a religious practice is
considered central or important to practitioners of the religion,
should be prohibited for the same reason that courts should not
make normative judgments about religious beliefs: “Judging the
centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious
claims.”156 In a fundamental way, however, judicial examination
of positive questions about religion is not akin to judicial
examination of normative religious questions. To describe is not
to judge, and the determination of what beliefs people hold does
not require a determination of whether those beliefs are correct.157
Judicial examination of the content of religious doctrine is more
akin to judicial determinations of the content of foreign law: when
a court determines what the law of England or Italy is, does not
154

McConnell, supra note 141, at 25; see also Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits.”)
155
Id. at 27.
156
494 U.S. at 887 (internal quotation omitted).
157
See McConnell, supra note 89, at 1144 (“In such cases, the court is not
judging the ‘merits’ of religious claims but solely trying to determine what they
are.”).
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judge the validity of those countries’ laws or endorses the policies
behind those laws. Courts are just as capable of determining what
Judaism or Hinduism have to say as they are at determining what
the laws of Israel or India are. This can readily be seen in cases in
which courts have determined the content of the law of theocratic
states, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, where religious law
governs.158
The clearest demonstration of judicial competence to
undertake factfinding about the content of religious doctrine and
practices is, as discussed above, that courts routinely undertake
extensive factfinding into the content of religious doctrines and
practices in determining whether a practice or doctrine is
“religious” and therefore subject to the protections of the Religion
Clauses and statutes addressing religion. In undertaking such
inquiry, courts routinely examine the content of a purported
religion’s beliefs and practices, its ethical teachings, its ceremonies
and holidays, and various accoutrements of religion.159 As
Professor Magarian has concluded, it is only a difference of
degree, not of kind, between the judicial factfinding necessary to
determine whether a practice or doctrine is “religious” and the
factfinding necessary to determine whether a practice or doctrine is
considered important or central to the religion.160
To be sure, religious beliefs and practices are frequently based
on faith or other nonrational sources, but determining what those
beliefs and practices are, or whether they are considered important,
does not require courts to employ anything other than ordinary
factfinding techniques. Courts competently can assess—that is,
describe—the content of religious doctrines and practices without
158

For instance, in Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir.
1992), an Iranian citizen sought refugee status on the ground that as a convert to
Christianity she faced a real threat of persecution in Iran. Experts on Islamic
law testified to help the court determine how sharia law would treat converts
like the plaintiff.
159
See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
160
Magarian, supra note 20 at 1960 (“The determinations about religious
substance necessary for strict scrutiny of accommodation claims differ only in
degree from the most basic judgments about what constitutes ‘religion’ within
the meaning of the First Amendment.”).
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assessing their validity.161 Taking what is perhaps a nonreligious
example, suppose that a palm reader agreed to provide a traditional
palm reading, but a customer refuses to pay, claiming that the
reading he received was unorthodox. There is no reason to believe
that a court would be incompetent to resolve the palm reader’s
breach of contract claim. Each side could call experts to testify on
the techniques of palm reading, describing what they consider to
be traditional techniques. Treatises could be consulted. Certain
basic points would become clear—that one line is known as the
love line, another as the life line. Other aspects of palm reading
might be considered more controversial within the palm reading
community. Based on the evidence, and employing ordinary
factfinding standards, a court could determine that certain practices
are considered traditional among palm readers, while others are
considered unorthodox. It could undertake such factfinding without
any need to determine whether palm reading has any validity in
describing personality traits, exposing the past, or predicting the
future. That is, courts have the ability to discover the rules and
doctrines understood to govern nonrational areas without making
normative judgments about those rules and doctrines. Indeed,
courts have long been charged with discerning the positive law
without judging its wisdom.162
Institutional competence thus justifies the reluctance of courts
to determine the validity or truth of religious claims and doctrines,
161

Legal principles, no less than religious beliefs, may be based on
unverifiable premises, but that does not prevent courts from determining what
those principles are or how they should be applied. The recognition that law,
like religion, may be based on unverifiable premises formed the basis for a joke
in Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Ballard, in which he characterized
belief in “dispassionate judges” as a mystical and unverifiable matter akin to
belief in Santa Claus: “All schools of religious thought make enormous
assumptions, generally on the basis of revelations authenticated by some sign or
miracle. . . . Religious symbolism is even used by some with the same mental
reservations one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter Bunnies
or dispassionate judges. It is hard in matters so mystical to say how literally one
is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches. . . .” Ballard, 322 U.S. at 94
(emphasis added).
162
See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our individual
appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected
by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute.”).
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but it cannot support a prohibition on judicial resolution of
questions about the content of religious doctrines and practices.
Courts have competence to apply the same processes of factfinding
to determine the contours of religious doctrines, yet refuse to do so
when a clergy person gets fired for failing to provide traditional
services, a merchant sells food claimed to be kosher, or a parent
fails to raise a child in an agreed religion. There may be good
reasons for courts to refuse to resolve such questions, but a lack of
competence is not one.
IV. DOCTRINAL ENTANGLEMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY OF COURTS TO ADDRESS RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
The prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions
reflects not only a concern with the institutional competence of
courts but also the constitutional competence of courts relative to
religious authorities, that is, the conviction that the Religion
Clauses leave the resolution of religious questions to religious
authorities, free from governmental entanglement and
interference.163 As the Supreme Court has said, “[T]he First
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left
free from the other within its respective sphere.”164 This Part
163

In this way, too, the prohibition is akin to the political question
doctrine, which rests upon the conviction that the Constitution leaves certain
decisions to be made by the political branches, free from interference by the
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (the
political question doctrine “is designed to restrain the Judiciary from
inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of
Government”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1959). Just as the political question doctrine
reflects a constitutional division of authority between the branches of
government, the Religion Clauses express a division of authority between
secular and religious bodies.
164
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948);
see also Michael McConnell, supra note 141 at 29 (the Religion Clauses divide
power “between two jurisdictions: the earthly and the divine.”); Tribe, supra
note 14 at 1226 (stating that the Establishment Clause reflects the “concern that
secular and religious authorities must not interfere with each other’s respective
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examines the extent to which judicial resolution of religious
questions interferes with the protected sphere of religion and
thereby exceeds judicial authority. First, it seeks to demonstrate
that the Establishment Clause is best read to prohibit courts from
judging the truth or validity of religious beliefs but not to prohibit
judicial resolution of positive questions about religion. Second, it
argues that the conclusion that courts may answer positive
questions about religion is unaffected by whether the question is a
matter of dispute or controversy within a religious community.
A. Prohibiting Judicial Resolution of Positive Questions About
Religion Cannot Be Squared with Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence and Theory
It is easy to see why judicial resolution of normative religious
questions intrudes into the sphere of religion protected from
government meddling. The Religion Clauses give each church
body, indeed each individual, authority to decide for itself, herself,
and himself what religious doctrines to follow, which rituals to
consider valid and meaningful, and which practices to deem
mandatory or optional.165 To declare a religious claim to be true or
false, valid or invalid, would directly entangle the government in
questions constitutionally assigned to the religious sphere.166
spheres of choice and influence”). As with the separation of political and
judicial authority, the division of authority between government and religion can
be understood in jurisdictional terms, under which the government would
exceed its jurisdiction if it decided religious questions. See Esbeck, supra note
14, at 10-11; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733 (stating that questions
of religious doctrine are “matters over which the civil courts exercise no
jurisdiction”); O’Brien & O’Brien, supra note 22 at 85 (arguing that church and
state are separate sovereigns, each of which can act independently and
exclusively within its sphere).
165
See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”).
166
In Justice O’Connor’s formulation, the government would likewise be
seen as violating the Establishment Clause if it “endorses or disapproves” a
religious message, as the courts undoubtedly would do if they were to assess the
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On the other hand, judicial resolution of positive questions
about religion does not interfere with the authority of religious
bodies or individuals to decide what beliefs to hold, what doctrines
to follow, and what practices to observe. The government plainly
cannot tell the Catholic Church who should be Pope, but it would
be hard to discern unconstitutional meddling with the church for a
court to say who the Pope is. The government would
unconstitutionally entangle itself in religious matters if it allowed a
jury to determine whether Guy Ballard actually possessed
supernatural healing powers because it would interfere with the
right of believers to decide that question freely, but there would be
no interference with religion for the government to declare that
Ballard’s followers believed him to have had such powers.
Likewise, it would not interfere with religion for a court to declare
that Orthodox Jews believe that the Torah prohibits them from
eating pork, that Christians believe in the divinity of Jesus, that
Cheyenne religion considers Devil’s Tower to be a sacred site, and
that Buddhists disclaim the existence of the self. Positive
declarations about religion pose little or no threat of interference
with religion because religious bodies and individuals remain
entirely free to decide for themselves what to do and what to
believe, and they remain free even if the government
mischaracterizes their beliefs and practices.167
A constitutional distinction between the government’s power
to make normative and positive declarations on matters of religion
has long been understood to apply in public schools. On the one
hand, public schools violate the Establishment Clause when they
require the recitation of prayers or daily Bible readings because
such requirements are understood to be tantamount to a
governmental embrace of the truth and validity of a religious
message.168 In contrast, the Establishment Clause allows public
schools to offer comparative religion classes, in which students
validity of religious claims. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
167
See Laycock, supra note 89.
168
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (Ten Commandments);
School District of Abington Twnp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (Bible
reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer).
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study the Bible, prayers, or other religious texts, so long as the
religious material is “presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education.”169 It has thus been recognized that, in
schools, the government may make positive but not normative
declarations about religious matters. There is no reason why the
Establishment Clause should apply differently in courts than in
public schools, prohibiting judges from making positive
declarations about religion that would be acceptable if made by
teachers.170
Not only the public schools, Congress and the Executive
Branch more generally are authorized to make positive
assessments about the content of religious beliefs and practices.
169

School District of Abington Twnp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (the Bible may
constitutionally be studied “in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion, or the like”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
607 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Courses in comparative religion of course
are customary and constitutionally appropriate.”); cf. Locke v. Davey, 124 S.Ct.
1307 (2004) (holding that the state does not violate the Free Exercise Clause by
prohibiting state funds from being used to pursue degrees in divinity: “Training
someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor. Indeed,
majoring in devotional theology is akin to a religious calling as well as an
academic pursuit.”); see generally Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in
the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & Pol. 329 (2002); Leslie Griffith, “We Do Not
Preach. We Teach.” Religion Professors and the First Amendment, 19 Quinn.
L. Rev. 1 (2000).
170
It may be tempting to say that declarations by judges about religion are
constitutionally different from the same statements made by teachers because
the resolution of cases may depend on such declarations. Unlike a professor’s
resolution of religious questions, judicial resolution of religious questions, if
allowed, would form the basis of government action. Litigants could win or lose
their jobs, monetary damages, or custody of their children, based on a court’s
understanding or misunderstanding of their religions. Cf. Robert Cover,
Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS
OF ROBERT COVER 203-238 (1995) (Minow, Ryan, and Sarat eds.) (arguing that
the fundamental difference between legal and literary interpretation is that the
former provides justification for the state’s use and threat of force). Yet the
cases adopting and applying the broad prohibition on judicial resolution of
religious questions make clear that the purely iterative act of resolving religious
questions is itself understood to be prohibited by the Constitution, without
regard to the effects of such iterations on the litigants. See supra notes 51-66,
84-89 and accompanying text.
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The political branches are understood to have authority to establish
exemptions from generally applicable laws for religious conduct,
and they may do so based on examination and assessment of
religious practices and beliefs.171 For instance, when Congress
decided to exempt Native Americans from state and federal laws
criminalizing the use of peyote, it issued legislative findings
regarding the content of Native American religion: “The Congress
finds and declares that . . . for many Indian people, the traditional
ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has
for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant in
perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures.”172 If the political
branches could not make such positive declarations regarding the
content of religious practices and beliefs, the government could
never act to accommodate religion. To prohibit the courts from
making the same sorts of declarations would create the anomaly
that the Religion Clauses apply more strenuously to the courts than
the political branches.
In addition, while judicial resolution of positive questions
about religion has been characterized as creating excessive
“entanglement” between government and religion,173 that
conclusion cannot be squared with the development of
“entanglement” as an Establishment Clause test.174
The
171

See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (“[I]t is a
permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
missions.”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[G]overnment [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed.”);
see generally McConnell, supra note 112; but see Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing
the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of
Religion, 140 Penn. L. Rev. 55, 580-587 (1991).
172
42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a).
173
See Tribe, supra note 14.
174
The current status of “entanglement” as an Establishment Clause test is
uncertain. Under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, government action was said to be consistent with the Establishment
Clause when (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its principal effect does not
advance or inhibit religion; and (3) it does not foster “an excessive entanglement
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prohibition on governmental entanglement with religion has never
been understood to embody an absolute prohibition of interaction
between government and religion but instead reflects in some
measure the inevitability of such interaction, as only “excessive”
entanglement with religion is understood to violate the
Establishment Clause.175 The caselaw gives imprecise guidance on
exactly what government interaction with religion is considered
excessive,176 but a rough standard of what the Court has considered
to be excessive may be gleaned from the primary area in which the
Court has employed excessive entanglement as a standard: the
recurring problem of government monitoring of the religious
content of programs receiving public funds. When public funds
are provided to religious entities, governmental bodies frequently
seek assurance that the money is being used for secular purposes
and not to advance religion.177 The Court has held that no
with religion.” 403 U.S. at 612-613. Since then, however, the Court has called
into question whether excessive entanglement should be regarded as a separate
test or an aspect of the effects test. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232
(1997). The status of the Lemon test itself is in doubt, with a majority of
Justices apparently adopting Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” test. See
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the
Establishment Clause is violated whenever the government “endorses or
disapproves of religion”); see generally Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The
Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion Clauses, 8 Sup. Ct. Rev.
323 (1995).
175
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (“Not all entanglements, of course, have the
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is
inevitable . . ., and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between
the two. Entanglement must be ‘excessive’ before it runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause.”); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (“[T]otal separation is not
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and
religious organizations is inevitable.”); see also Roemer v. Maryland Public
Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 745-746 (1976) (“A system of government that makes
itself felt as pervasively as ours could hardly be expected never to cross paths
with the church. . . . “[A] hermetic separation of the two is an impossibility and
has never been required.”).
176
See Laycock, supra note 65 at 1392 (“Sometimes [entanglement] seems
to mean contact, or the opposite of separation; it has also been used
interchangeably with ‘involvement’ and ‘relationship.’ Sometimes it seems to
mean anything that might violate the religion clauses.”).
177
Because the government must maintain a “course of neutrality . . .
between religion and non-religion,” Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473
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excessive entanglement arises when the government monitors the
content of a religious organization’s services, as long as such
monitoring is not “pervasive” and does not involve continuous
government “surveillance” of religious entities.178 Under these
cases, no excessive entanglement with religion occurs from
unannounced monthly visits by government officials to assess
whether a religious entity is using public funds to promote
U.S. 373, 382 (1985), the government cannot deny funding to an organization
solely because it is religious when it provides public funding for other
organizations doing similar work. Compare Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
(1988) (upholding federal funding of agencies, including religious entities, to
provide services addressing teenage sexual problems); Roemer, 426 U.S. at 746
(upholding state statute providing subsidies to qualified colleges, including
religiously affiliated institutions, stating that “religious institutions need not be
quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all”); Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S 1 (1947) (approving busing services available to
both public and private school children), with Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that, where the
government generally allows private groups to use public school rooms to be
used by private groups after school hours it cannot deny the use of such rooms
to religious organizations).
178
For instance, in Lemon, the Court examined Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania programs that reimbursed private schools for the costs of
providing secular courses also offered in public schools. The Court found that
the programs involved excessive entanglement with religion because the
programs required “[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance” of the content of the courses taught by the private school teachers
in order to ensure that the courses were limited to strictly secular subjects and
did not inculcate religion. 403 U.S. at 619. In contrast, in Tilton v. Richardson,
the Court upheld a federal program that provided construction grants to colleges
and universities, including religiously-affiliated institutions, but which specified
that the funds could not be used to construct buildings used for religious
instruction, training, or worship. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). The Court found that the
program did not foster excessive entanglement because it involved only minimal
government monitoring to ensure that buildings constructed with public funds
were used for secular purposes. Id. at 687 (“Such inspection as may be
necessary to ascertain that the facilities are devoted to secular education is
minimal.”). In one of its most recent pronouncements, the Court held that no
excessive entanglement resulted from a government program involving
intermittent monitoring of whether public funding of remedial school teachers
was being used for religious indoctrination. Agostini, 521 U.S at 232-233. In
short, excessive entanglement will only be found where there is “pervasive
monitoring by public authorities” of the religious content of programs provided
by religious organizations. Id at 233.
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religious or secular content,179 or when religious entities are
required to prove the absence of religious content in its publicly
funded programming.180
As these cases established, the
government does not interfere with religion whenever it examines
the content of services provided by religious bodies. No principle
of entanglement that can be gleaned from the cases supports the
conclusion that judicial examination of the content of religious
doctrine should be considered any more intrusive, or so inherently
intrusive as to bar courts from asking examining religious content
in every case, such as asking the parties to a contract to explain the
meaning of a religious term appearing in the contract, from asking
a merchant who labeled food to be kosher to explain the use of that
term, or from inquiring whether a church employee was fired on
the basis of sex or on the basis of religious standards. In this
context, “entanglement” represents simply a label for the anxiety
created by government involvement in matters touching on
religion.181 It does not identify a principle for prohibiting judicial
factfinding regarding religious matters.
B. Courts May Resolve Disputed Religious Questions Unless
Doing So Would Involve Normative Judgments on the
Correctness of Religious Views
Passages in several of the Supreme Court’s opinions suggest
that the prohibition on judicial resolution of religious questions
applies most forcefully when courts are called upon to resolve
controversies or disputes over religious doctrines. For instance, in
Thomas v. Review Board, two witnesses disagreed over whether
179

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-233.
See, e.g., Tilton, 403 U.S. at 680 (finding no excessive entanglement
where religious institutions receiving public funding “presented evidence that
there had been no religious services or worship in the federally financed
facilities, that there are no religious symbols or plaques in or on them, and that
they had been used solely for nonreligious purposes.”).
181
Cf. Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party
Harms, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 589 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence under the Religion Clauses is guided by two anxieties, an “anxiety
of entanglement” and an “anxiety of anarchy”).
180
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the doctrines of the Jehovah’s Witnesses are consistent with
performing work for the military, but the Court ruled that it was
beyond judicial authority “to inquire whether the petitioner or his
fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their
common faith.”182 For the reasons discussed above, it would
violate the Establishment Clause principle of neutrality for a court
to decide that one side in a religious dispute takes the normatively
correct position. A court therefore could not constitutionally
resolve the disputed question of whether performing military work
is sinful. But the Constitution should not be read to prohibit a
court from determining what beliefs are actually held by Jehovah’s
Witnesses, a question that can be addressed without determining
whether those views are correct.
In order to address the free exercise question in Thomas, it
was unnecessary to determine what doctrines are held by the
Jehovah’s Witnesses because the right to free exercise of religion
guaranteed by the First Amendment is an individual right, which
does not depend on whether an individual’s religious beliefs
accord with the other members of his religion.183 But in other
cases the parties’ rights may well depend on an assessment of the
religious beliefs of an organized religious body. Suppose that a
contract requires a minister to abide by the standards of her church,
but she is fired by the church board for presiding at a gay wedding,
in violation of the official doctrines of the church. The minister or
the board should be able to point to the official positions of the
church in challenging or defending the employment decision. A
court may determine whether the minister’s action violated the
church’s standards without in any way deciding whether those
182
450 U.S. 707 (1981); see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 605 (stating that
courts may not interpret religious doctrines if doing so “would require the civil
court to resolve a religious controversy”); Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709 (“[T]his
case essentially involves not a church property dispute, but a religious
dispute.”); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449 (“But First Amendment values
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”).
183
See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 466 (“For most kinds of cases,
there are powerful reasons to adopt an individual’s perspective, not the group’s.
It is the individual who is seeking to engage in behavior; his or her convictions
should matter the most.”).
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standards are correct. That the church and the fired minister may
disagree over whether those standards are correct does not change
the nature of the court’s positive inquiry, nor does it drag the court
into undertaking a normative inquiry into which side correctly
perceives the faith.
In some cases, the answer to disputed positive questions about
the content of religious beliefs may be indeterminate and thus
insufficient to resolve the religious issues presented by a case. For
instance, in Zummo v. Zummo, discussed above, although
divorcing parents had agreed not to take their children “to religious
services contrary to the Jewish faith,” the noncustodial parent took
her children to Catholic services.184 The religious question
presented by Zummo—does “the Jewish faith” allow Jews to attend
non-Jewish religious services?—is a positive question, in that it
can be answered by describing Jewish beliefs without taking a
position on whether or not those beliefs are correct. The purely
descriptive answer to that question, however, is indeterminate, in
that some strains of Orthodox Judaism construe Jewish laws and
traditions to prohibit Jews from attending services in a Christian
church, while Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative
Judaism take a contrary position.185 A court could describe those
differing beliefs but constitutionally could say nothing more.
Other than saying that there are disagreements among the sects, a
court could determine that “the Jewish faith” allows or forbids
Jews to attend Christian services only by crossing the line into
resolving the normative question of which Jewish sect is correct.
To answer that question would be tantamount to a judicial
endorsement of the doctrinal position of one sect at the expense of
others. As a result, the court could determine whether the
noncustodial parent violated the divorce agreement only if it could
determine that the Zummos had in mind a particular Jewish
denomination in setting out the terms of their agreement.
Disputes within a religious community highlight the
difficulties that may arise in distinguishing positive from
184

Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1142.
See Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Confrontation, 6 Tradition: A Journal of
Orthodox Thought (1964).
185
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normative questions about religion. The application of the kosher
food laws presents a good case in point.186 It is possible to
understand the question of whether food is properly labeled to be
kosher in either normative or positive terms. One could view the
question in normative terms as addressing the truth of the religious
claim that the food complies with the laws established by God for
the Jewish people. That appears to be the conclusion of courts that
have held such statutes unconstitutional.187 Defenders of kosher
food laws have seen the question in positive terms, as addressing
whether food is “kosher” in the common meaning of that term,
without in any way addressing whether Jewish dietary laws have
any legitimacy.188 As this Article has argued, a court may not
determine whether food actually is ritually fit for consumption
according to God’s laws any more than it may determine whether
Devil’s Tower actually is a sacred site, but a court may
constitutionally determine whether Jews believe the food to be
kosher just as it could determine whether the Cheyenne people
consider Devil’s Tower to be sacred.
The distinction between a court’s authority to resolve positive
and normative religious questions, while sometimes quite slippery,
becomes especially significant when there are disputes within a
religious community. For instance, Orthodox Judaism generally
considers swordfish to be unkosher, while Conservative Judaism
considers it to be kosher.189 A court constitutionally may answer
only the positive question—would swordfish be understood within
the Jewish community to be kosher?—the answer to which is
indeterminate. For a court to determine whether swordfish
186

See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1263 (concluding that
kosher law is unconstitutional regardless of whether there is any religious
dispute over what food is kosher: “The laws of kashrut are intrinsically
religious, whether they are ambiguous or not and whether they are disputed or
not. Religious doctrines cannot be recast as secular principles simply because
they are clear. . . . Nor do religious doctrines become neutral simply because
they are widely or even universally held.”).
188
See supra note 104.
189
See Yacov Lipschutz, KASHRUTH: A COMPREHENSIVE BACKGROUND
AND REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF KASHRUTH 158-160 (1988); 6
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 27.
187
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actually is kosher would require the court to determine which set
of rabbis are correct in their religious position, a determination that
entails a normative judgment on which religious denomination
correctly perceives God’s commands.190
While the answer to disputed questions over the scope or
content of religious beliefs may sometimes be indeterminate, the
existence of such a dispute should present no bar to judicial
examination. Litigants may readily gin factual disputes over
religious beliefs and practices, making the existence of religious
controversies too easily manipulable to function as a threshold
inquiry. Moreover, if the existence of disputes over religious
beliefs and practices were a threshold question, it would only push
the resolution of religious questions up a level of generality, as
courts would still be required to assess whether there could be any
plausible controversy over the religious issue, a question that itself
would call for examination of religious matters. In any event, as
with judicial examination of non-controversial aspects of religious
practices and beliefs, courts cannot feasibly avoid examining
190

Although he does not employ the positive-normative distinction
advanced in this Article, it would appear that this distinction underlies the
position presented by Kent Greenawalt in discussing the constitutionality of
kosher food regulation. See Greenawalt, supra note 19. Professor Greenawalt
argues that courts may not adopt an Orthodox definition of “kosher” where there
are disputes between the Orthodox and Conservative communities over whether
food is kosher: “Such unequal treatment should be regarded as a denominational
preference . . . [which] unjustifiably promotes Orthodox Judaism at the expense
of Conservatism.” Id. at 810. In contrast, Professor Greenawalt asserts that a
court could uphold a fine imposed against a merchant with an idiosyncratic
definition of what food is kosher—in Professor Greenawalt’s example, someone
who claims that any food prepared in the right spiritual environment should be
considered kosher, even pork, which Jewish traditions have long emphatically
considered unkosher. In such a case, Greenawalt concludes that a court could
undertake a positive inquiry into deciding whether the use of the term “kosher”
comports with a common understanding of the term to mean “acceptable
according to traditional Jewish standards.” Id. at 793. In Greenawalt’s view, a
court assessing that positive question would not be understood to endorse those
standards: “It does not say people should follow kosher requirements; it merely
assists those who have this belief in fulfilling it.” Id. at 792. The latter
hypothetical is troubling, however, in that it suggests an idiosyncratic or
minority religious position would receive less protection than more established
beliefs.
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matters of religion over which disputes within a sect exist. In
County of Allegheny, for example, the Court had to assess the
religious significance of a Hanukkah menorah in deciding whether
a public display violated the Establishment Clause. On this point
there was conflicting evidence in the record, some testimony
suggesting that the menorah had become primarily a secular object,
other evidence suggesting its continued religiosity.191
Conceivably, a description of the religious significance of the
menorah could be understood to endorse one religious view at the
expense of another. But if courts could not resolve disputes over
the religiosity of an object or practice, they could not plausibly
know what practices and beliefs are protected by the Religion
Clauses.192
CONCLUSION
The broad prohibition against judicial resolution of all
religious questions, positive or normative, is a recent innovation.
While that broad prohibition was first articulated in the church
property cases of the 1960s and 1970s, its breadth only became
clear in Employment Division v. Smith. Since Smith, the prohibition
has been applied in innumerable contexts, with the unexpected
result that a broad swath of cases are now deemed nonjusticiable
merely because they would require courts to examine the content
of religious beliefs and practices. The rationales articulated for
this prohibition—the competence of courts to resolve religious
questions and the separationist principle embodied in the
Establishment Clause—support only the modest rule adopted in
Ballard, that courts must not purport to pass judgment on the
merits of religious beliefs. These rationales do not support the
much broader rule, applied since Smith, that courts must not
attempt to resolve even positive questions about religious practice
or doctrine. Such a broad rule is not supported by logic or history
and, in any event, would be impossible to apply in the absolute
manner articulated by the cases.
191
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See 492 U.S. at 613-621.
See Magarian, supra note 20; Conkle, supra note 119.
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The conclusion that courts are not broadly prohibited from
resolving positive questions about religious doctrines and practices
does not mean, however, that courts must necessarily resolve all
such questions whenever they arise.
Certainly, there are
circumstances when courts properly refuse to resolve even positive
religious questions for reasons wholly apart from those used to
support the broad prohibition discussed in this Article. For
instance, a statute or cause of action under which a party raises a
religious question may not actually require the court to resolve the
question. In this regard, courts issued conflicting decisions over
whether RFRA protects only those religious practices that are both
central to the plaintiff’s religion and mandated by that religion,
with some cases holding that the Constitution absolutely prohibits
them from determining whether religious practices are mandated
by religion or whether religious beliefs are central to a religion, a
conclusion that should be rejected for the reasons discussed in this
Article. 193 It may well be, however, that the text of RFRA does
not require such inquiry, even if the Constitution and judicial
competence would allow it. Indeed, given that religious freedom
embodied in the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA is understood as
an individual right, and not in terms of institutional religions, cases
arising under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA should rarely
call on courts to decide between conflicting views about religious
doctrines and practices, as the individual claimant’s understanding
of his or her religion should control.194
There may also be cases in which the Religion Clauses bar
courts from taking certain actions based on a resolution of religious
questions. Suppose that a rich man donates a large sum of money
to a Jewish congregation on the stipulation that the congregation
remain true to Orthodox practices, but the congregation eliminates
sex-segregated seating and institutes mixed-sex seating. If the
donor seeks an injunction against the congregation on the ground
that mixed seating conflicts with the traditional practices of
Orthodox Judaism, the logic of this Article suggests that there is no
bar to a court deciding whether Orthodox Judaism allows men and
193
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See supra note 111.
Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 89 at 466.
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women to sit together during religious services. The conclusion
that a court is institutionally and constitutionally competent to
decide that factual question does not, however, mean that no
constitutional problems would arise if a court were to issue an
injunction against the practice of mixed-sex seating, as such an
injunction would almost certainly violate the free exercise rights of
the congregation and its members.
A court’s authority to undertake factfinding into positive
questions about religion is thus a distinct question from its
authority to impose remedies that may have the effect of inhibiting
the exercise of religion. The means by which courts should resolve
whether a proposed remedy may exceed the court’s constitutional
authority, however, demonstrates the impossibility of prohibiting
judicial resolution of religious questions. In order to determine
whether the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from
imposing an injunction against a Jewish congregation from
instituting same-sex seating, a court would have to determine,
among other things, whether such seating constitutes the exercise
of religion, a determination requiring courts to make positive
assessments about the doctrines and practices of religion. Thus,
the resolution of Free Exercise Clause cases, like many others,
depends on a court’s determination of the content of religious
beliefs and practices. Such determinations do not exceed judicial
competence and cannot plausibly be considered to prohibited by
the Constitution.

